


JPRS-UMA-94-050
30 November 1994



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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MILITARY POLICY

Lebed Comments on U.S., Russian Security Policies

95UM0075A Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS
in Russian 26 Oct 94 pp 1-2

[Article by Aleksandr Minkin: "Peace Is War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a speech in America, the president of Russia said: "At first it was hard for the President of the United States to look me in the eye." At this moment the diplomats probably grabbed their hearts. This is a harsh statement, to put it mildly. A person who cannot look someone in the eye is one who is lying or is afraid or is guilty of something. By the way, the president friends soon reached agreement and there were handshakes, hugs, smiles, kisses, and honest, direct, and frank views.

Did Clinton have reasons to avert his eyes?

Shortly before the meeting with the president of Russia, President Bill Clinton sent to Congress the report "National Security Strategy of the United States." Such a report goes to Congress every year along with the draft budget for the next fiscal year, which begins 1 October there.

The report is concise, clear, and very militant. For some time now, all American presidents have loved to fight (this is useful for their popularity and success in the elections). They borrowed their doctrine from Stalin—"A little blood on someone else's territory"—and the sharpness came from Suvorov in "The Science of Victory."

It is not overly pleasant to read this report but I understand that this is because it is American. If the report from the president of Russia sounded like that, I would like it.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS

The nature of the actions of the United States in the international arena must to the greatest extent possible conform to long-term American national interests, which in the final analysis are determined by the country's security requirements, including **above all the guaranteeing of defense** and economic prosperity. They also imply the necessity of protecting the environment and preserving social values by increasing the number of democratic states.

The strategy of national security extends to the political, military, and economic spheres.

Priority Goals

Strengthening of the security of the state:

Taking into account the realities of the time after the "cold war" and the new threats, the armed forces must have the numerical strength and deployment of groupings to respond to different requirements of our strategy,

including the capability together with our regional allies to be victorious in two major regional conflicts occurring almost simultaneously. As before, we will strive to achieve agreements on arms control with the objective of reducing the danger of the start of a nuclear conflict."

Guaranteeing the prosperity of the country

Vigorous and purposeful economic policy must stimulate global economic development taking into account the protection of the environment and free trade and it must guarantee the free and even access of the United States to foreign markets.

Development of democracy

The expansion of democracy increases our security through the protection, consolidation, and increase in the number of democratic states with a market economy.

Assessment of the Situation in the World and the Role of the United States

We are no longer threatened either by a powerful Soviet grouping nor by Soviet missiles aimed at the United States with a willingness to launch them. At the same time, there continues to be a complex set of new and old threats to security in the world.

The world is living not only in a period of great changes but also great uncertainty.

The United States is the principal world power.

Former adversaries are now cooperating with us at the diplomatic level and in the resolution of global problems.

There has been a dramatic reduction of the threat of war between the great powers and of the probability of nuclear destruction. At the same time, there remain uncertainties and obvious threats that disturb us.

The future of Russia is uncertain and a repressive regime remains in China.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a serious threat.

American leadership in the world is now important as never before. Without our active leadership and participation in international affairs, the spectrum of threats to our security will expand, whereas the choice of favorable possibilities will become narrower.

The foreign policy of the state must serve the needs of the nation.

The three main components of U.S. strategy:

- the strengthening of its own security through a strong defense potential and cooperation with other countries in the area of security;
- activities of the United States aimed at opening foreign markets and accelerating global economic growth;
- support of democracy abroad.

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The Pentagon has concluded a comprehensive analysis and full-scale assessment of which armed forces and weapon systems are needed by our country in this new era of security.

The president repeatedly stressed that **he will not allow either further reductions of armed forces or a weakening of the combat readiness of the U.S. Armed Forces.**

The "Partnership for Peace" approved by the NATO bloc in January 1994 and other major new American initiatives are called upon to guarantee the readiness of NATO to react to challenges to security in Europe and in the Atlantic in the new era and also to establish the kind of interrelations in the security area that would tie the former communist states to Western Europe.

Our security requires vigorous efforts in the area of arms control and the maintenance of a significant reconnaissance potential.

Maintenance of a Powerful Military Potential

The U.S. Armed Forces play a key role in the achievement of success in the implementation of our strategy.

The United States is the only state that is capable of carrying out large-scale and successful operations far from its boundaries and that is capable of accomplishing different missions:

- participation in major regional conflicts;
- guaranteeing of the necessary presence in overseas territories;
- counteracting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
- participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations;
- support of efforts to fight terrorism and other actions in the interests of guaranteeing national security.

The U.S. Armed Forces must be capable of reacting quickly and effectively and they must be prepared to fight and win.

In special cases when vitally important interests and questions of survival are at stake, that is, those interests that have tremendous importance for security and the survivability of the nation, **our use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral.**

The United States is striving to prevent the appearance of new states with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons as well as the means of delivering them. But if efforts in this area do not yield results, then the U.S. Armed Forces must be prepared to deter and prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction and also to defend against them.

The United States is maintaining its capability to inflict strikes against countries that would want to use weapons of mass destruction.

Strategic Nuclear Forces

We will maintain strategic nuclear forces at a level adequate for the future deterrence of any state hostile to us that possesses nuclear weapons.

We will continue to maintain our nuclear forces at a level where they can destroy a broad spectrum of targets of key importance for political and military leaders of other states.

The United States favors the ratification and implementation of the START-I and START-II treaties.

Development of Reconnaissance Capabilities

Only strong reconnaissance is capable of guaranteeing the necessary warning against threats to the national security of the United States and of making it possible to advance our initiatives.

Europe

Stability in Europe is vitally important for our own security.

The "cold war" is over but there is still a danger of war.

The policy of the United States in Europe is:

- to prevent the spread of conflicts to other states, which may threaten the allies of the United States as well as the new democratic states of central and Eastern Europe
- to stop the flow of refugees from the zone of conflicts;
- to stop the loss of innocent lives;
- to affirm the leading role of NATO in Europe.

The armed forces will remain a necessary element in policy even after the end of the "cold war."

Many institutions, including the United Nations, European Union, West European Union, European Council, and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe will play their role. **But the NATO bloc, historically the largest military-political union, must occupy a central place.**

The contingent of American armed forces in Europe, numbering about 100,000 persons, is capable of maintaining the leading role and influence of the United States in NATO and of guaranteeing an effective policy of deterrence that would correspond to the interests of the states and western and eastern Europe.

In the course of his trip to Europe in July 1994, the President of the United States again stated his support for a future expansion of the NATO bloc utilizing the "Partnership for Peace" program as the most nearly optimum way to achieve membership in this organization.

East Asia and the Pacific Ocean

East Asia is a region of increasing importance for the security and prosperity of the United States.

Security questions have priority importance in Asia.

We see the continuation of the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula and in South Asia as the most important task in the framework of the new cooperation in the Pacific Ocean.

We are continuing to expand comprehensive cooperation with the PRC, which corresponds to our strategic and economic interests.

Middle East, Southwest and South Asia

The United States has long-term interests in the Middle East, including the protection of the security of Israel and our Arab friends, and also the guaranteeing of free access to the oil resources of the region.

In South Asia, we are seeing a process of the spread of democracy. The United States is pushing India and Pakistan to reach an agreement on the reduction of their programs for the creation of weapons of mass destruction.

We singled out the most provocative wording in Clinton's report.

There is a share of hypocrisy in every political document. If you consider yourself the main power of the planet, what kind of partnership are you talking about? Partnership is equality or it is called something else. ("That is right, Lenya," says the mocking voice from behind the scenes, "that is right, Lenya, we are partners!") As valuable as free access to oil may be, it is believed proper to begin this subject with concern about the "security of Israel and our Arab friends." But most annoying of all is the triumphant tone of the report. It seems that the word "victory" is not mentioned in our military doctrine.

Every day after the arrival of the president of Russia in the United States, there were hearings in the Defense Committee of the State Duma of Russia. The subject: the military budget of Russia.

Speaking to the deputies were Colonel-General Churbanov, chief of rear services of the Armed Forces of Russia; the deputy minister of finance; and the deputy minister of economics. Presiding was Mr. S. Yushenko (Lieutenant Colonel?), chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation.

In offering to readers a brief report on this meeting, we allow ourselves three preliminary remarks:

1. It was not possible to obtain either a shorthand notation, or minutes, or even the briefest official report on this meeting of the Defense Committee. What you are about to read is a quite unofficial and in places possibly erroneous record. We hope that in that event the Defense Committee will inform us with correct report.
2. It is quite possible that the hearings were secret. We do not care. Of course a citizen of Russia is supposed to keep the secrets of his country. But what kind of secrets (and from whom?) can we be talking about after foreign workers repaired the residence of the government (the former White House) and the building of the Duma (the former State Planning Committee)?

It is not at all a matter of prestige, for we also have skilled workers. But it would be better for the Turks to build the temple of Christ the Savior than for them to repair offices in which the state secrets of Russia are now being discussed. (It is said that this work was given to the Turks because they did not charge very much. Possibly they would have agreed to do it for nothing.)

3. It was very unpleasant for me to read these "hearings." But I understand that this is because they are Russian. If I were an American, I would have liked them very much.

HEARINGS IN THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE OF THE STATE DUMA

25 September 1994. Chairman—S. Yushenko

Representative of the Ministry of Economics:

- at hand is the total collapse of the armament of the army;
- the military-industrial complex is disintegrating: 660,000 of the 1.1 million people employed in the branch may be discharged by the end of the year;
- there are no reforms in the army;
- there is no unique buyer;
- old models are being ordered;
- huge amounts of money are being spent for repairs—as much as 80 percent of the original cost (an example is that of submarines, where major overhauls after 20 years of operation continue for 6 years and the service life is extended by another 16 years);
- major disagreements with the Ministry of Finance;
- they are supposed to allocate 5.6 percent of the gross national product to defense taking into account an inflation coefficient of 2.25 percent; the Ministry of Finance takes a different approach: 4 percent of the GNP with an inflation coefficient of 1.34, thereby budgeting 30 percent less for defense than this year.

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Representative of the Ministry of Finance:

- we are fully executing the Law on the Budget;
- the income part [of the budget] is formed from taxes and income from privatization;
- in September, the income part of the budget collapsed; receipts amounted to just 62 percent;
- expenditures are also planned on the basis of the 62 percent;
- the Border Troops are 80 percent financed, the Ministry of Internal Affairs 70 percent, and the Ministry of Defense 62 percent;
- the state has no priorities in the area of financing;
- everything happens with a telephone call;
- a large amount of foreign exchange has been transferred to the Ministry of defense but where is it?
- a large part of the allocated funds goes for "protected items" (wages and purchases) and the remaining sum is distributed by the minister of defense himself;
- for 1995, we are planning 60 trillion rubles [R] for defense. The Ministry of Defense is asking for R110 trillion.

Final word from Yushenkov:

- parliamentary hearings are necessary on this matter so that we can look into everything and establish order;
- it is necessary to decide what kind of army we need so that we can maintain it.

It is sad to read this Russian document after the American one. There is already practically no money but they are spending it on old things, on the repair of 40-year-old submarines, and possibly even on machinegun carriages. Where is the foreign exchange? How much does Minister Grachev release and for what?

The "doctrine" evokes real amazement, saying that we need the kind of army that we can maintain. That is like delirium. I always thought that we need the kind of army that can protect us. And if it cannot do this, then there is no reason at all to maintain it. It is enough that we are maintaining a Duma that cannot think.

But can it be that everything is not so bad? Is it possible that the dilettante journalist simply does not understand the specifics? We appealed to someone who does understand. At our request, a professional military man, Lt. Gen. Aleksandr Lebed, comments on the documents and situation.

COMMENTARY OF GENERAL LEBED

As you know, the Americans are pragmatists and for this reason Clinton's report is not florid but rather is extremely concise and laconic. The main conclusion from the report is this:

- the political changes in Russia that for some reason do not suit the Americans automatically make Russia the number one enemy for the United States.

The cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation is pragmatic in nature. When the power is exhausted, so is cooperation. More accurately, it will move to another plane (that of master and servant).

The new "era of security" is based on the powerful military foundation of the primary world power, the United States. "Partnership for Peace" and other major new American initiatives are carrots for a goat.

The U.S. Army is assigned a key role in the establishment of a new world order. They are prepared to react quickly and effectively and they are prepared to fight with great determination in circumstances that are not formulated precisely and that may be interpreted broadly; the employment of the U.S. Army may be unilateral. The United States reserves for itself the right to inflict a preventive strike against those countries that "would like to employ weapons of mass destruction," although it is absolutely unclear how this can be determined.

Although the Warsaw Pact has ceased to exist, the United States is insisting on the leading role of NATO in Europe (condescendingly mentioning the European Union, the CSCE, the United Nations, and so on). The 100,000-man contingent of the U.S. Armed Forces in Europe may help to disillusion anyone who does not agree with this.

On Military Cooperation in the Scope of the CIS

A priority of any state is the guaranteeing of its security either through its own forces or in the framework of the collective structure of military-political blocs or alliances.

The problem for the countries of the CIS lies in the state in which they found themselves after the disintegration of the USSR, when the basic strategic defense base was disrupted, namely the following main elements of it:

1. In the system for the monitoring of aerospace, uncontrolled sectors developed in potentially dangerous missile-space directions.
2. The formerly unified and effective air defense system was disrupted.
3. The unified military-industrial complex disintegrated, as did the base for research and experimental design work. Moreover, we are clearly seeing a desire of some Western "protectors" to give Russia "help" in the conversion of primarily those enterprises of the military-industrial complex that can still produce arms that are competitive in the world market.

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4. The system for the training of officer personnel for the armed forces has been substantially undermined and even destroyed in some areas.
5. The overall military infrastructure has been disrupted.

These and other consequences of the disintegration of the USSR gave rise to a return to the idea of a unified security system, because not a single state in the CIS is capable of resolving these problems independently.

It is quite obvious that only Russia has sufficiently important defensive possibilities remaining (after the collapse of the USSR) in the above-mentioned areas.

At the same time, we are already clearly seeing a tendency as well as practical help from the United States, Germany, and other states in Western Europe and the NATO bloc in the formation not only of the national armed forces of the Baltic countries but also of a unified defensive alliance in the zone of the Baltic Sea.

We are facing a dual approach of the West to the problem of the formation of a collective security system in the time after the end of the "cold war."

Let us take a look at the "strategy of the victors"—at our modest vitally important Russian interests and goals.

Threats in the Military Area:

- existing and potential focuses of local wars and armed conflicts in the immediate vicinity of Russia;
- the unsettled nature of the command and control of the strategic nuclear forces of the former USSR;
- the violation of the integrity of defense and the indefiniteness of the regime of the national border of the Russian Federation, especially in the southern and western sectors;
- unsettled legal questions in the stay of Russian troops in the territory of the states of the near abroad.

Potential Threats in the Military Area:

- the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in combination with attempts by some countries to utilize them in the realization of their own military objectives;
- the presence in a number of states of large arsenals of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
- the preservation or establishment of powerful groupings of armed forces of states or coalitions of states in regions that are strategically important for the Russian Federation;
- the possibility of the undermining of strategic stability as a result of the technical backwardness of the Russian Federation, the erosion of the scientific-technical and personnel potential of its military-industrial complex, the violation of international agreements in the area of the limitation and

reduction of arms, and the quantitative and qualitative proliferation of armaments by other states;

- the preservation of the threat of international terrorism and blackmail, including with the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Brief Conclusions:

- hearings in the Defense Committee of the State Duma do not contribute to mental comfort and social optimism;
- the West assesses the striving of former republics of the USSR for integration as "imperial ambitions" of Russia. Imperial ambitions are better than servile traditions. Ask anyone where he prefers to live, in a powerful empire or in an impoverished "developing" country that is begging for an extra seat in a limited group or that is asking to be admitted to the vestibule of NATO;
- our economy was integrated over decades and even centuries. The coefficient of technological dependence is 0.32 for the Russian Federation, 0.41 for Ukraine, and 0.99 for unfortunate Moldova. This is the degree of our dependence on each other.

Result: Anyone who is not sorry about the disintegration of the Union has no heart but anyone who thinks that it can be restored in its previous form has no brain.

They have continually prepared for war on both sides of the oceans: of the Atlantic as well as of the Pacific. In the 50 years of the cold war, the military people of both superpowers became accustomed to seeing each other as "enemy number one."

We fought in Afghanistan and the Americans fought in Vietnam but the nuclear missiles of both "strongholds of peace" were always aimed at the "evil empire." It sometimes seemed that the next hot spot was set up only so that (under the pretext of friendly assistance) the stronghold of peace could test new weapons in a combat situation—test them in a small war in anticipation of a large one.

It is natural that our generals, our army, indeed all of us have not been able to forget the "enemy image." We are supposedly friendly with America but this friendship is still very thin, just like a crust on lava. If you take a step, you will fall into the fire.

And it is natural that any military movement of the old enemy is perceived as a threat: Aha! You act like we are friends but look what you are doing!....

The commentary of General Lebed (the strongest statements were omitted here for diplomatic reasons) evoked the question: "Are you not being too harsh?" Lebed answered:

"You (obviously he meant civilian people—A.M.) may play at democracy as much as you like. But whatever happens, I am the one who will have to fight. And I do

not care what kind of political regime exists in Russia, we in the army are going to fight for her."

There is nothing to say to that. One can only ask: Does the army want a fight (and hundreds of thousands of dead) or peace? And if it is peace, then must the army indifferently allow a regime to come to power that will drive us to war? For it does not know how to do anything else other than shake its fists.

All military people are first of all citizens and then soldiers. First of all they are voters. And first one must vote and then fight or not fight. And this means that everyone, even the bravest officer, must decide whether he and his children will live or die because of someone else's stupidity?

War is the continuation of politics through other means. This means that it is precisely politicians who lead a nation to war. But it is the army that has to fight. It is the politicians who push it into pacifying or saving "friends." But to die in any case.

We asked a professional politician, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, to comment on these documents ("National Security Strategy of the United States" and "Hearings in the Defense Committee of the State Duma of Russia").

COMMENTARY OF YAVLINSKIY

Russia has neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies. Russia has **interests**. They are immutable and they must be protected whatever happens.

The strategy of the Russian Army is to protect Russia and its interests.

Russia has the longest border in the world with the most unstable regions. The main threats are seen in the southern and southeastern sectors and also from those who have territorial claims against us.

The Russian Army must be able under all conditions to maintain nuclear parity, the potential for nuclear deterrence, and the capability to preclude an attempt at a nuclear strike against their territory.

An army that is capable of carrying out such missions will always be an extremely important factor in world politics. Russia is so large and situated in such a way and so much in the world depends on Russia that the Russian Army will always be the army of a great power.

Our interests are immeasurably broader than any foreign strategy with respect to us.

The main thing for us is the defense of the borders rather than overseas operations. The report by Clinton does not say anything about the borders of the United States, because they do not have problems either with Mexico or with Canada.

All of the problems of the United States are far from America. All of Russia's problems are in our immediate

vicinity. Historically it has happened that Russia fought almost on its entire perimeter.

Today nothing threatens us in a global sense from the west or the southwest (Romania is not going to attack us). But in the southeast, several million foreigners (unarmed so far) have already crossed our border and are settling in our territory without permission.

When two such documents (Clinton's report and the hearings in the Defense Committee) lie side by side, the illusion arises that they depend on one another.

But this is an erroneous approach.

It is not important what the Americans write but what we ourselves do.

All of our main problems are **internal problems**. **95 percent of the threats come not from outside but from within Russia**. And most of them come from within the Garden Ring.

The lamentation in the Duma is simply laughable. The level of deputy ministers is not the level at which the problems of the army must be resolved today.

Last summer the budget was discussed continuously in the Duma. The army received scarcely half of the requested sum and insisted on an increase of 18 trillion.

Neither the commander in chief (with the right of legislative initiative) nor the prime minister nor even the minister of defense defended the military budget in the Duma.

If the government does not defend it, how can the parliament be expected to pass it? **(The only parliamentary group that sought—and achieved!—a specific increase of 4 trillion (3 trillion for procurements and 1 trillion for development of new systems) was the "Yabloko" group—A.M.)** And now no newspaper articles will yield even a kopeck if this time the president and prime minister do not come to the Duma to explain their position on the military budget.

A powerful army is an insufficient condition to be a world power. Also needed are an efficient economy, a high standard of living, a democratic system, and a stable federative structure.

As for the CIS, an economic union is absolutely essential in this phase. It includes a customs and payments union, the coordination of monetary, tax, and budgetary policy, the maximum convergence of economic legislation, and, of course, free trade. We need what is realistic. Such an economic union is realistic.

As for Western alliances and unions, Russia will never be a member of NATO and will never be a member of the European Union. We have other dimensions and other tasks. We can have tense relations or the very best relations with NATO and the others. But only relations and not membership.

Russia has two paths to the future:

- either movement in dialogue with the civilized world, with mutual concessions, mutual advantage, and mutual respect
- or movement without looking to anyone, in confrontation and general enmity.

The most important thing for the security of Russia is the position of the people in the army.

At least three things are essential: a respected command, sensible objectives, and financial security.

The serviceman and those close to him must be proud to belong to the army (as was the case here for centuries) and the reform must come from this.

As long as the attitude of the authorities to the army is awful and as long as our boys run from the army as from prison, what difference does it make what the Americans write in their doctrines?

Now, in rereading the Clinton report, it can be said that it is an excellent doctrine. If does not infringe upon our interests if we ourselves do not allow them to be infringed upon. If the United States encourages India and Pakistan, say, to renounce weapons of mass destruction, then praise God. For this coincides fully with our interests.

As for the possibility of becoming "enemy number one" for the United States, it will not be because of some caprice that they declare us as such. We ourselves will become "enemy number one" for the United States and for almost the entire world. For this it is only necessary to elect Zhirinovskiy president and to begin the push to the Indian Ocean, that is, a blitzkrieg.

Only an insane person can want Russia to "expand" to Ceylon. Not in hundreds of years of the natural course of history (if such a thing is meant to be) and not as the result of a blitzkrieg.

In the event that this idea is successful, there will be 800 million new "Russians" within the new ("eternal") borders. We will acquire 800 million poor and sick people. And this will make us richer?

The 150 million "old" Russians must, it seems, become the overseers and physicians of the new ones. How can we feed them? How can we treat them medically? How can we employ them? How can we guard the borders? How can we put down the inevitable guerrilla actions, considering the fanaticism of the people in the south and considering the desperation of Islam....

This is a typical Stalin-Hitler syndrome: drive your own country into concentration camps and take your tanks to establish order in foreign lands.

Not one professional military person wants to undertake a blitzkrieg or to subdue the world. This idea always arises in the overheated brain of an ignoramus. His studies do not work out, he has no friends, and he is unsuccessful with women.... And then this failure and inept person develops the maniacal desire to take revenge on everyone, to bring down the whole world and disfigure it. That would be Chikatilo at the level of everyday life and Zhirinovskiy at the political level.

If You Want Peace, Prepare for War

There was so much joy when the official (and there was no other kind) press of the USSR ceased to forge the image of the enemy. It was so pleasant to experience the warm wave of love and friendship that melted the ice at the end of the 1980's. The domestic hawks appeared to be narrow-minded and moss-covered. But like it or not, we must recognize that everything is not as simple as we would like it to be. There are the views of the "ordinary American" and there the "interests of the Pentagon." There is the natural desire and necessity to reduce the military forces of Russia and there are the "interests of the military-industrial complex" and the homeless officers and thieves in uniform. There is the friendship between Yeltsin and Clinton and the profound professional interest of military intelligence.

A very knowledgeable officer of our army told me that during the time of the joint Russian-American exercises 20 transport aircraft of the U.S. Air Force brought the American contingent and equipment to the Totalskiy Proving Ground. They accomplished the delivery in three runs. Each of the 20 aircraft made three trips. The curious thing is that they used the same aircraft but each time they had different crews. In this way, the flight over Russia and landing in the center of our country involved 60 crews, 120 pilots, and 60 navigators, not counting the flight engineers, radio operators, and others.

The objective of the exercise was declared to be the working out of joint actions against terrorists. But it seems that the Americans did not overlook some additional possibilities. Good work, lads.

That is just like under Orwell: friendship is treachery and peace is war.

[Boxed material]

The Army Votes

Why did we ask for commentary from Lebed and Yavlinskii? The answer is simple: trust. Trust is something that cannot be bought with money, with flattery, or with anything else. Trust can only be earned.

We offer the results of a unique survey. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation (one of the most authoritative in the world) surveyed 615 top officers of the Russian Army (including 60 generals and admirals). The survey was accomplished not only at Arbat but also in the Moscow, St. Petersburg, Volga-Urals and North-Caucasus military

districts, in the North Sea Fleet, in Siberia, and in Kaliningrad. The question: I trust, I do not trust.

The table presents the percentages of "trust" (positive) and "distrust" (negative). It graphically depicts the sum of positive and negatives responses. In assessing the results of the survey, one must always remember that the persons surveyed

are regular officers who were members of the CPSU for a long time. Nevertheless, they preferred Yavlinskiy, who was a private and did not belong to the party, over General Rutskey and the top communist Zyuganov. The almost zero "result for Chernomyrdin" indicates that overall the army elite is indifferent to the chairman of the Council of Ministers. It will neither support him nor attack him.

Opinion of the Military Elite on Whom They Trust and Whom They Distrust

Individual	Trust (Percent Positive)	Distrust (Percent Negative)	Sum
Lebed	58	18	40
Gromov	54	16	38
Yavlinskiy	44	25	19
Chernomyrdin	35	34	1
Zyuganov	30	41	-11
Rutskey	29	46	-17
Yeltsin	29	53	-24
Gaydar	22	66	-38
Grachev	17	52	-35
Makashov	16	56	-40
Sobchak	17	58	-41
Shumeyko	15	55	-40
Volkogonov	13	63	-50
Filatov	11	47	-36
Zhirinovskiy	10	70	-60
Khasbulatov	8	64	-56
Achalov	7	46	-39
Anpilov	7	59	-52
Burbulis	5	64	-59
Gorbachev	3	79	-76

Footnote

*In September 1994, President Clinton affirmed the new nuclear strategy of the United States that was presented to the Pentagon:

1. It is inexpedient to further reduce the American nuclear arsenal, because of the slow pace of the dismantling of nuclear weapons by Russia and because of the remaining danger that a regime hostile to Washington could come to power in Moscow.
2. The United States is cooperating with Russia to reduce to a minimum the risk with respect to 25,000 nuclear warheads of Russia.
3. The United States does not intend to obligate itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.
4. The United States will maintain its nuclear weapons in Europe for an undetermined time.
5. It is planned to reduce the number of SSBN's in the U.S. Navy from 18 to 14 while equipping them all

with new highly accurate "Trident-2" D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles; to reduce the number of B-52's from 94 to 66; and all 90 B-1's will carry conventional weapons.

Army Paper Outlines Backdrop To NPT Renewal Process

MM2111094194 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 15 Nov 94 p 3

[Report by Mikhail Rebrov: "Nuclear Pandora's Box, or Reducing the Risk 25 Years On"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty came into effect on 5 March 1970 and expires next year, 1995. What has happened in the past 25 years, what can we expect in the future, and when, if it all, will the main objective of the agreement be attained—"an end to the production of nuclear weapons and the destruction of all existing stocks and removal of nuclear weapons and delivery means from national arsenals"? These questions are being asked today, they are of

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concern to the world public, they are being raised at major forums, and they are never off the pages of the press. They were discussed, in particular, at an international seminar in Minsk, organized by the Russian-American information press center. [passage omitted describing history, operation, current spread of nuclear weapons]

In nearly 50 years of the arms race the total number of nuclear weapons created by the nuclear states exceeded 60,000. According to the experts, they contained between 900 and 1,130 tonnes of highly enriched uranium, around 200 tonnes of weapon-grade plutonium, and around 200 kilograms of tritium.

Some more statistics. As of November 1993 the nuclear states had carried out 2,064 tests of nuclear devices. Russia, the United States, and Britain have declared a moratorium on nuclear explosions. There is reason to believe that France and China are unlikely to join the nuclear test ban treaty before they have carried out new tests for the purpose of modernizing their nuclear arsenals and ensuring the reliability and safety of existing stocks.

No one asks any more whether there is a danger of nuclear weapons spreading to nonnuclear countries. The international community is concerned that this danger is very great. And here are the reasons why. European black market interception of consignments of nuclear materials and thefts and smuggling of uranium and plutonium, which are increasingly becoming the stuff of press reports, are not just worrying, they are frightening.

How much fissile material is considered sufficient for the manufacture of an explosive device? A conclusion based on data contained in UN document No. A/6858 ("Consequences of the possible use of nuclear weapons...") would go as follows: For plutonium-239 (95-percent plus content) the minimum quantity of material is eight kilograms; for uranium-235 (more than 90-95 percent) it is 25 kilograms; for uranium-233 it is eight kilograms.

There is another logical question: "If the requisite quantity has been accumulated, how much time will it take to create the explosive nuclear device?" A difficult question. It all depends on how sophisticated the production operation is, on the technical skills of the specialists, on the ability to turn the various forms of nuclear material into the metal components of an explosive nuclear device, and so on. But one can give some rough figures.

Say, for instance, a country has plutonium, highly enriched uranium or uranium-233 in the form of metal and the complicated production processes have already been tested: The time would be 7-10 days. If the same materials are being used, but the uranium-235 was in the form of oxides or in irradiated fuel, the time increases from a matter of weeks to three months. With uranium containing less than 20-percent uranium-235 and uranium-233 or thorium, the amount of time required is around one year.

So far 164 states have joined the Nonproliferation Treaty. Does this mean that the world is at least to some

extent guaranteed against the appearance of new "nuclear bridgeheads"? Unfortunately not. Recent events confirm one unfortunate trend relating to the end of the Cold War: Superpower nuclear confrontation may have ended, but the nuclear era continues. We are still unable (true, alas!) to shut the lid of the nuclear Pandora's box. But the world community can and must limit and rigorously control the threat emanating from it.

Russia has taken a step in that direction and measures for controlling exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology have been determined by a special edict of the Russian Federation president. Presumably other states will be concerned to "reduce the nuclear risk," and the IAEA will fundamentally review its control functions. But perhaps the main point is that the treaty itself must be a more reliable guarantor of nonproliferation.

New YADERNYY KONTROL Monthly Journal Previewed

MK2311143094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 58, 20-27 Nov 94 (Signed to press 22 Nov) p 2

[Unattributed report under the "Presentation" rubric: "Russian Now Has 'Nuclear Verification'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Russia so far has had no publication fully devoted to arms control problems. Now that YADERNYY KONTROL [Nuclear Verification] has appeared, it seems that the vacuum is starting to be filled." Thus did presidential national security adviser Yuriy Baturin start his word to readers of the new monthly journal.

The "pilot" issue of YADERNYY KONTROL is just off the presses and is being mailed to the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia [Belarus], and Kazakhstan; mass destruction arms experts; and journalists. Thanks to support from the "Kon-Tekst" publishing house (president Oleg Orlov) the issue is being mailed free of charge. It contains information and documents on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons nonproliferation; physical protection against nuclear materials; and export control. The issue features an interview with Gennadiy Yevstafeyev, a Foreign Intelligence Service chiefs; an article by Ambassador Roland Timerbayev on the extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty; debates surrounding Ukraine's nuclear ambitions; a "Red Mercury" data base. All the analytical material is exclusive.

YADERNYY KONTROL is published with scientific and information support of Georgia State University, the Monterey Institute of International Studies (U.S.A.), and Moscow's Center for Political Studies in Russia (Tsentr PIR); among its founders are the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the Institute of Economic Policy of the Transition Period, and MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. Once a month MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI will publish a digest of materials that are being prepared for publication in YADERNYY KONTROL.

Ecology: Costs of Chemical Weapons Destruction

95UM00824 Saratov STEPNYE PROSTORY
in Russian No 7, 1994 pp 5-7

[Article by V. Petrenko, cochairman, Saratov Oblast "Union for Chemical Safety", under rubric "Ecology": "Chemical Weapons Destruction—At What Cost?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was signed in Paris over a year ago, on 13 January 1993.

Thus, the majority of countries of the civilized world decided to get rid of this most barbarous of all kinds of mass destruction weapons. This wise decision must be welcomed in every way, for chemical weapons in essence are ecological weapons against one's own people. Although not having been employed against the enemy on a large scale since World War I, they have taken hundreds on thousands of lives and undermine the health of the population in all stages—development, testing, production, storage and destruction.

Having the world's largest arsenal of this kind of mass destruction weapon, the former Soviet Union also experienced this to the full extent. According to official data, after various submergences and burials carried out in the USSR for decades, many of these weapons—40,000 tonnes—nevertheless have remained.

Russia has been faced with the very serious problem of fulfilling international obligations and getting rid of such an unpleasant heritage. The most important thing here is not to harm nature and especially people's health. The ecologic aspect of chemical weapons destruction is the most important one and any kind of compromises and economy here are impermissible.

But through the fault of departments responsible for this, Russia proved to be technologically, ecologically and legally unprepared to ratify the Convention.

It so turned out historically that for decades the Povolzhye was the forge of the military-chemical shield and sword. Beginning in 1926 a research and test facility was established at Shikhany together with Germany. Evidently the OSOAVIAKHIM [Society for Assistance to Defense and the Aviation-Chemical Industry of the USSR] idea was strong. Later there was the joint construction of a plant for producing mustard gas in the present Chapayevsk, Samara Oblast, and then dozens of plants: Dzerzhinsk, Gorkiy Oblast; Volgograd, Kazan and Novocheboksarsk in Chuvashia; "and then everywhere." Saratov Oblast also was not done out of its fair share; it now has the honor of being the center of the country's military-chemical complex. The Shikhany military installation (VOSH, as military chemical warfare personnel wittily designate it) includes the Ministry of Defense Central Scientific Research and Test Institute of the Chemical Troops with a military-chemical proving ground and central chemical depots. The Volsk affiliate

of GSNiOKhT [State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technologies] found shelter on Ministry of Defense lands. The base establishment, the State Union (now Russian) Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technologies, is located in Moscow on shosse Entuziastov and received international prominence for its chemical weapons developments after an article by doctors of chemical sciences V. Mirzayanov and L. Fedorov in September 1992.

After this, evidently out of considerations of modesty, the Volsk affiliate with the experimental plant decided to separate formally and be renamed the State Institute of Organic Synthesis Technologies (GITOS). This did not interfere with receiving dangerous wastes for destruction from Moscow, and not just from there, now on a contract basis. This now is virtuously called "recycling," but the methods are the same—incineration.

The Oblast's left-bank area has its own "chemical thorn"—a chemical arsenal near the settlement of Gornyy, Krasnopartizanskiy Rayon, where 225 tonnes of lewisite, around 690 tonnes of mustard gas and around 210 tonnes of their mixtures are stored in containers. Military scientists believe chemical weapons destruction is possible in the settlement of Gornyy and also in the vicinity of Ozinki and Aleksandrov Gay. This is why Saratov Oblast is one of the potential centers for accomplishing chemical disarmament.

And this is what is placing the Povolzhye ecologic community on guard. There are sufficient reasons for this, but the majority of them are based on lies of official military chemical warfare chiefs. This has become so rooted in the awareness that it is manifested in actions taken to the absurd. For example, the draft "State Program for Destruction of Chemical Weapons in Russia," which went through parliamentary hearings in the Russian Supreme Soviet on 19 January 1993, stated that chemical weapons are stored at seven bases, but only four were named and three remained classified for deputies, although all information about this already had been transmitted previously to the U.S. side. Only after a long period of coming to an agreement did the military inform representatives of their own people about arsenals in Bryansk Oblast (Pochep), Penza Oblast (Leonidovka) and Kirov Oblast (Moradykovka).

And it is a total tragedy when lies are elevated to the rank of state policy in the area of chemical disarmament, for those who for decades, deceiving the world community, forced the state and thereby the people to spend billions for dangerous weapons not needed by a nuclear power, are "implementing" the lies.

Doctor of Chemical Sciences Vil Sultanovich Mirzayanov was first to sound the alarm by publishing the article "Poisoned Policy" in the September issue of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI for 1992 in coauthorship with Doctor of Chemical Sciences Lev Aleksandrovich Fedorov.

For telling the truth about the military-chemical complex, a criminal case was fabricated against Mirzayanov under Article 75 of the Criminal Code, allegedly for divulging a state secret.

He had to sit more than just a single week in Matrosskaya tishina and Lefortovo before the criminal case was dismissed in March 1994 because of the absence of a corpus delicti after one and a half years of the scientist's persecution.

But the policy of intimidation did not pass without leaving a trace.

Except for two persons, none who previously worked in the military-chemical complex spoke out during the last year. One of them is the author of these lines, who worked as a junior scientific associate and served to the rank of major in TsNIIKKhVMO (not further expanded, possibly Ministry of Defense Central Scientific Research Proving Ground of the Chemical Troops) at Shikhany-2 (Volsk-18). After taking part in secret experiments in 1982 I became convinced on my own hide or, more accurately, my skin and entire body, that even micro-quantities of chemical agents are dangerous for health and that the guarantees and assurances of military specialists—chemical warfare and medical personnel—of the harmlessness and absence of consequences to health were not worth a plug nickel. After just two years I was declared unfit for work in the profession based on the finding of a medical board. I was forced to warn the public about this a year ago, and as chairman of the Volsk City Soviet Ecology Subcommittee I could not permit experimenting of this sort, but on a larger scale, on the health of Saratov countrymen. For this I was accused of divulging military and state secrets, which did not pass without leaving a trace.

A specialist who had been engaged in developing the newest Soviet chemical agents—Vladimir Ivanovich Uglev, former senior scientific associate of the State Institute of Organic Synthesis Technologies from Shikhany-1 (Volsk-17)—also appeared in the press. For his article in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI of 31 January and for an interview in the journal NOVOYE VREMYA in early 1993, the Ministry of Security instituted criminal proceedings under Article 75, "Divulging State Secrets," although again no secrets were divulged. Only immunity as a deputy of the Volsk and Shikhany soviets prevented a rapid reprisal against him. Ecologists nominated him for the State Duma, and during the election campaign he and a support group conducted explanatory work on the trouble hanging over the region. Uglev did not get into the Duma—there were another four rivals in the district territory out of the 16 Oblast rayons—but in Volsk his ideas received the greatest support of electors.

Nevertheless, the Oblast procurator's office found no grounds for dismissing the criminal case "on facts of divulging state secrets." The all-powerful military-chemical departments confirm this: at their instigation,

on 30 March 1993 the Council of Ministers and Government adopted Decree No 256-16, in which "information revealing the content of work previously done in the area of chemical or biological weapons, or the substance of this work and results . . . are declared to be a state secret."

And this two and a half months after Russia signed the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons?!

What safe technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons can be in question? What public discussion of the problem and what publicity and democracy can there be? Specialists are forced to be silent, and the public remains in the position of amateurs.

To what does this lead? Here is where it leads. Back in December 1992 in the Little Soviets of the Saratov Oblast Soviet your obedient servant sounded the alarm concerning the unsanctioned destruction of chemical weapons at Shikhany Proving Ground. The authorities remained apathetic and indifferent. What was the result?

According to data of the Volsk Children's Hospital and Polyclinic Association, in 1993 alone children's illnesses rose five times for kidney disease, three times for diabetes mellitus and three times for asthmatic bronchitis and bronchial asthma, and this is occurring against the background of a drop in the birth rate (by 18 percent for 1993).

In Volskiy Rayon in the summer of last year dozens of cases were observed of people being affected by burns and ulcers, the clinical picture of which resembled the effect of blistering agents. The city administration assigned the investigation... to the very same military chemical warfare personnel with whom "work is done periodically on the grounds of the military installation under the plan approved by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, including with use of explosives and munitions, as well as construction work" (from the response by General V. Danilkin of 26 November 1993).

It is natural that they discovered no chemical agents and named as the most likely cause a "grass of the Siberian cowparsnip type," which does not grow in our area. And from what did this cowparsnip become so brutalized in this year during conduct of the work?

It is possible to name presumed causes without fearing accusations of "intimidating public opinion." Official excuses always were based on environmental pollution by discharges of industrial enterprises, but environmental protection services note a drop everywhere in discharges of enterprises for economic reasons—a drop in production. This also affected the industry, including the cement industry, of the city of Volsk to the full extent, especially last year. Even the State Institute of Organic Synthesis Technologies, which destroyed 1,500 tonnes of various chemical wastes from all of Russia during 1991-1992, reduced its environmentally pernicious activity during the last year.

But what changed? Military specialists from two sinister places—Aralsk and Vozrozhdeniye Island, where biological weapons were forged—and chemical warfare colleagues from Nukus and the chemical proving ground on Ustyurt Plateau were transferred to Shikhany Proving Ground and the Institute. A sovereign republic had evicted dangerous guests. But will Russia and the Saratov land endure it all?

The specialists do not rule out that unfinished scheduled work continues "with use of explosives and munitions." The migrants will not be left without work.

Two or three times a week explosions are heard from the proving ground that shake windowpanes in neighboring built-up areas. What is this? There is an assumption that work is under way to destroy chemical weapons by the explosion method.

Military chemical warfare personnel respond very evasively to these questions, for all this is a state secret, but it is being done according to plan. Not accepting any public ecologic monitoring and again forcing us to take his words on faith, General Danilkin, chief of the Shikhany military installation, writes in one official response: "This work is not having any harmful effect on the health of the population and the ecologic situation of nearby built-up areas. In accordance with instructions received earlier from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, samples may be taken at any time at the boundaries of the proving ground."

It would be possible to believe in safety and openness as well as in the accessibility of monitoring, but here is the bad luck. The general passed over in silence that "presently existing equipment does not support monitoring of pollutants for populated areas, and such equipment is being developed." This is an assertion not by "ecologic extremists," but from Paragraph 5 of "Conclusions" of the draft "State Program for Chemical Weapons Destruction in the Russian Federation," signed by Chief of Troops S. Petrov, by Convention Committee Chairman A. Kuntsevich and by 20 Government deputy ministers.

Therefore supreme authorization also has been given for taking samples, [but] no one will discover anything nor is there anything with which to determine it. Moreover, this is a costly matter and the monopoly on instruments and methodologies lies only with authorized people, and they know how to keep state secrets; whoever is unable to do this is taught.

So people's health is the sole indicator. An analysis even of carefully concealed sickness rates signals danger. And it is the task of the procurator's office to look into whether or not the cause for this is the creation of something new or destruction of something old.

But to this day no one has taken an interest and has taken no steps to stop the military-chemical complex from violating the Russian Federation President's declaration on the problem of chemical weapons of 20 April 1993. The head of state declared that "work of destroying chemical weapons will begin only after a positive opinion of state ecological expert examination of the Program as a whole and for each installation." Work goes on despite the fact that there still is no State Program, let alone expert examination. On 29 June and 14 October 1993 two protocols were signed on the problem of chemical weapons destruction, which deem it possible for the development of technologies and accommodation of experimental units "to be carried out at the State Institute of Organic Synthesis Technologies facility in the 3rd and 4th quarter of 1993" and "to consider it possible to transport chemical agents from the urban settlement of Gornyy to the settlement of Shikhany" and so on. These documents untie hands and give the okay for continuing the work.

The consequences are known. Intentions of processing at Shikhany the arsenic-containing stocks which form during detoxication of lewisite have not been abandoned. The fact is, the soil in this region already has been polluted by arsenic by 1-3 times above the threshold limit value. The myth of the arsenic shortage and universal enrichment has been created for the economic temptation of local authorities. The ecologic aspects of technologies and population safety fade into the background.

Saratov Oblast and Shikhany have been given the role of a test range where chemical weapons destruction technologies will be worked out, stocks will be processed and solid and other wastes will be buried. Chemical weapons destruction is becoming a tasty morsel behind which stand many billions in rubles and dollars. The absence of public ecological monitoring under the circumstances at hand gives rise to fears that the noble task of departments getting rid of chemical weapons may be turned into evil. The population and public are being given the role of extras who do not influence the future and the destinies of themselves and their children in any way. Thus, despite many thousands of appeals by Volsk residents, the authorities are ignoring their right to hold a referendum on this question.

One can in no way agree with that fate. Man's right to a worthy life, to health and to a normal natural environment of habitation is just as inalienable as the right to receive and disseminate information and the right of freedom of speech.

A solution to ecologic problems for the Povolzhye is most urgent, for the poison affects everyone and is especially cruel to children, the ill and the weak.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Rogov on Army Reform

954F0285A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Nov 94 pp 1, 5

[Article by Sergey Rogov under the "Alternatives" rubric: "Will the Russian Armed Forces Stand Fast: The Forgotten Military Reform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There was an ideological imperative that ruled the life of our country over many decades. Everything was subordinated to the "struggle against imperialism." And not only ideological. At the cost of enormous efforts, a huge military machine was built, capable of sustaining parity in nuclear and conventional arms, and not only with the United States, but also with Europe, Japan, China—practically with the rest of the world. The Soviet Union's degree of militarization was unprecedented.

It was this burden of the arms race that turned our country into the "Upper Volta with missiles." Sooner or later this burden was bound to become unbearable. And this is indeed what happened. First began the agony, and three years later things come to a head—the "superpower" collapsed.

The USSR ceased to exist, but the Soviet military machine remained, and now more than 80 percent of it belongs to Russia, which inherited slightly more than a half of the Soviet Union's territory and population. This is why military reform is as much of a priority for Russia's survival and development as economic and political reforms.

What Is Military Reform?

Let us remind ourselves that reforms of the military had been implemented in the past as well—under Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Alexander II (the "Milyutin reform"), and during the period of NEP ((New Economic Policy)) (the "Frunze reform"). The need for reforming the military usually arises with change in the economic and state system, or radical changes in the spheres of technology and politics.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the change of the sociopolitical system in our country, the restoration of Russian statehood, and the transition to a market economy and formation of a democratic political system predetermined an urgent need for a radical military reform.

But military reform is more than just changing uniforms and badges of rank. Military reform requires a substantial transformation of the entire military system of the state, that is, the entire mechanism of training and use of military force for the purpose of ensuring vitally important interests of the state. *Military reform must bring military policy into line with foreign policy interests and economic capabilities of the state.*

The Need for a Military Reform

Military reform cannot be postponed until after the year 2000, as some military figures maintain. Today's Armed Forces are out of line with Russia's economic capabilities and are poorly prepared to deflect the most likely threats to its security.

The economic factor. The disintegration of the USSR and the industrial decline resulted in a sharp shrinking of the economic base of our country's military potential. Russia's gross domestic product [GDP] today is three times smaller than that of the Soviet Union and comprises no more than one-tenth of that of the United States. In terms of GDP size, Russia slid down into the second ten in the world. But since Russia inherited approximately 80 percent of the Soviet military-economic potential, the proportional share of the VPK [military-industrial complex] in the Russian economy is higher than it was in the Soviet one.

Today's Russia cannot sustain the VPK and the Armed Forces that were built for a "superpower."

The impossibility of accommodating in Russia the troops withdrawn from other countries. The process of withdrawal began in 1989. By 1991 more than 100,000 units of armored vehicles, aircraft, and artillery systems were brought back. Over the past three years, approximately as much was brought back from the countries of Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics. This operation, unprecedented in peacetime, involved gigantic transportation costs. Moving just one division requires more than 75 heavy troop trains; in total, more than 50 combined-arms divisions were moved, not counting Air Force and PVO [anti-aircraft defense] units.

Is it possible to accommodate, that is, build military bases for, such a force (as well as the Baltic Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla), over such a short period of time—only a few years? It is not accidental that the share of capital construction expenses in the defense budget became unusually high. In the Soviet times, accommodations for one division cost more than R100 million, that is, R200 billion-R300 billion in today's money. The 8 billion marks received from Germany solved only a small part of the problem. As a result, most redeployed troops found themselves literally in the open field: Combat equipment spends the winter in the open air, and officers and their families live in tents and barracks.

The demographic factor. In the fall of 1994, the draft was supposed to cover only 250,000 persons. The draft contingent in Russia is less than half that of the USSR. In addition, there has been a sharp increase in draft-dodging and desertions. Almost 80 percent of draft-age young people do not want to serve in the army. Draft campaigns resemble military operations, with future soldiers being escorted to the military draft office at gunpoint.

The Armed Forces' social problems. While three years ago there were about 100,000 officers in Russia without apartments, today there are more than 200,000. Impoverishment of the officer corps results in its demoralization.

Moreover, judging by all signs, the military became the social base for supplying "soldiers" to the Russian mafia.

Runaway hazing habits continue in the military. Many officers find themselves in extremely difficult conditions, but for soldiers it is much worse.

International obligations. Russia is cutting strategic arms by about 50 percent under the START-1 treaty and by about as much under the START-2 treaty; it has cut tactical nuclear arms by 80 percent, and completely eliminated medium-range missiles; in keeping with the CARE ((conventional arms reduction in Europe)) treaty and the Tashkent treaty, it is to cut the main types of ground arms in Europe by a factor of six and airborne arms by a factor of three. In addition, we agreed to limit the military presence in a 100-km zone on the border with China.

Russia cannot ignore international obligations under the arms control treaties that demand radical cuts in both conventional and nuclear arms our state inherited from the Soviet Union, and which also put serious limitations on the formation of groups of forces and resources on the territory of the Russian Federation.

Unfortunately, military reform in our country is practically not being implemented. The national political leadership essentially removed itself from "interfering" in the military sphere, leaving it to the defense department to deal with its own affairs. Moreover, in October 1993 the military found itself in the role of arbiter in the course of the conflict between the executive and legislative branches of authority.

Instead of reforms, the MO [Ministry of Defense], much like any bureaucratic entity, strives first and foremost to keep its structure and its budget, keeping the cuts to a minimum. The main emphasis was made on support for troop withdrawal and their accommodation in Russia. Such an attempt to squeeze the Soviet Army into a "Spanish boot" resulted in regrettable consequences: Russia today is oversaturated with a huge number of undermanned and poorly supplied units and formations, as well as hastily organized armaments and equipment warehouses. These conditions have overstrained the support infrastructure (fuel, electric power, rent, etc.) of the Armed Forces and made it impossible to ensure normal combat training for the troops. As a result, the fighting fitness of the Armed Forces has declined sharply.

Let us look at most important tasks of the military reform.

Civilian Political Control of the Military

The main task is finally to remove the schism between the Armed Forces and the state, which is precisely what happened after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The military was promised after the Belovezha summit that it would remain integrated. But this was an illusion, because the military cannot be a quasi-state entity.

As a result, for some period of time the military ceased being an instrument of state policy and was left to itself. This left its imprint on the military's actions in the Baltics, Moldova, the Transcaucasus, the Black Sea Fleet, and Tajikistan. The process of becoming aware of one's new statehood identity, painful for everyone, turned out to be especially torturous for men in uniform. Some of them very soon found themselves on opposite sides in the Dniester region and Abkhazia, Ossetia, and Nagornyy Karabakh.

Practically all the new independent states today are encountering the problem of restoring (or developing) union with their armed forces. So far, the army has not become a reliable instrument of implementing the state policy anywhere.

Russia is better off than others—the Soviet Army became a Russian one—but this has not solved the problem. The important part is that there is no state mechanism of civilian political control over the Armed Forces. Neither president nor parliament nor the Security Council realistically have such control.

To a considerable extent, this is associated with the uncompleted process of building a democratic state in Russia. The Soviet model turned out to be inapplicable. Although in the USSR there was strict political control over the Armed Forces, it was neither democratic nor even state control—it was carried out by the CPSU (and its organ, the KGB). After the liquidation of the CPSU, a vacuum emerged, and so far attempts to fill it have not been very successful.

The first reason is rejection of the idea of creating a civilian Ministry of Defense, as is common in most democratic states. It looks as if now the idea has been consigned to oblivion.

Second, after the adoption of the new Constitution, the military essentially has been taken from under the control of organs of representative power. The weakness of the parliament's power is especially evident in stripping it of the right to appoint the Ministry of Defense leadership and the top brass. The parliament and its committees' capabilities in controlling the defense budget are extremely limited. Russian lawmakers do not get any exhaustive information—just the most general (and not very convincing) figures. It looks, though, as if they remember well how the previous conflict between the executive and legislative branches ended, and do not want "to turn a deaf ear to the military's requests."

The next reason is the fact that the Ministry of Defense and other "muscle" agencies are practically no longer subordinated to the government. As a result, for instance, an amazing situation is developing, whereby the budget prepared by the government, including defense expenditures, and the Ministry of Defense's budget request differ nearly by an order of magnitude. And in executing the budget, too, the Ministry of

Finance allocates the money whenever it feels like it, and the Ministry of Defense spends the money as it sees fit.

Finally, the Security Council, which could have become a key organ in drafting and coordinating defense and foreign policy, essentially turns to these matters only sporadically. Because the sphere of its competence includes the entire range of "burning" problems—from ecology and health care to finding out what caused the "financial putsch." It looks as if having rejected (and correctly) a strictly military (and KGB) interpretation of national security, we thereby made this notion boundless. And in the system of executive authority the Security Council also occupies some strange place. How can it be that the Security Council and the president's advisers on national security, international affairs, and military affairs are institutionally separated?

What are the ways to resolve this problem? First, it is time to recall that democracy cannot exist without glasnost and openness. Of course, one cannot do without secrets in the military sphere, but today even the most general data on the numeric strength of the Armed Forces and the quantity of armaments at their disposal, as well as the budget data that were published openly as recently as at the end of 1980's, are being concealed from the public. Manipulation of measured information resembles a game of thimble. Any abuses and corruption are possible on this basis. The informational "iron curtain" made possible such tragedies as draftees dying of emaciation on Russkiy Island and the murder of journalist Dmitriy Kholodov.

In the final count, the military itself needs openness. Our society simply does not realize what colossal efforts are required in order to resolve the problems we have inherited in the military sphere. Half-measures, which only preserve, and sometimes even exacerbate, these problems, will not do. The tasks of demilitarization—first and foremost social settlement of military servicemen and defense industry conversion—must be perceived by the public as priorities. And this is not going to happen without truthful information.

Second, it is time to return to the idea of a civilian Ministry of Defense. Today it is indeed impossible. Because of the traditional isolation of the military sphere, we have too few civilian specialists in these matters (remember what damage to the very idea was done by nominating G. Starovoytova to the post of minister of defense). This means that we have to think how we could begin such reorganization without making abrupt moves.

An important step in this direction could be made by the president creating a civilian consultative body on military issues, bringing into it on a strictly individual basis the civilians possessing relevant knowledge in related spheres, for instance, specialists in economics and finance, international affairs, information sciences, and so on. Working in interaction with the Ministry of Defense leadership, such a body would allow us to

acquire in time, as in the United States and a number of other Western countries, a layer of qualified civilians brought in by the political leadership to work in the military sphere.

Next, as early as next year we could separate the functions of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. The ministry would engage in administrative matters, while the General Staff—the military's brain—would become an organ of operational leadership of the troops. It could also be possible to offer the minister and his deputies to resign their commission and continue work in the same positions but already as civilians.

As a result, in a few years we would have preconditions for a final transition to a truly civilian Ministry of Defense.

Third, it is expedient to reorganize the Security Council. Quite obviously, the functions of the Security Council secretary and the president's national security adviser should be combined in one person. Since the Security Council cannot deal with all issues simultaneously, it would be logical to concentrate its activities on the traditional sphere (defense, foreign policy, intelligence and counterintelligence), and transfer all other issues into the competence of a different organ—the Economic Security Council, whose secretary could be the president's economic affairs adviser.

Fourth, it is time to recognize the need for sensible parliamentary control over the military sphere. This involves first and foremost the defense budget. The point is not just that without control on the part of the representative authority abuse and waste are inevitable. Only close interaction between the defense department and the parliament will ensure stability of defense policy and prevent jumping from one extreme to another.

The role of the State Duma and Federation Council committees that deal with defense issues should be particularly noted. They must possess all the necessary capabilities for a thorough analysis of defense policy and on this basis facilitate formation of a competent opinion among the entire deputy corps. Otherwise, attempts to use the discussion of military issues in demagogic interests are inevitable.

The Military Budget and the Reforms

If we are moving toward a market, it is time to acknowledge that the Soviet methods of mobilizing the economy toward military goals (thanks to which we won the Great Patriotic War) are unacceptable in market conditions. "Price is no object to us!"—this slogan was not just empty words—it was a program of total militarization of the society and state. The official defense budget was only the tip of the iceberg, behind which were concealed considerably greater expenses on development and production of weapons which the military received "free of charge."

We forget today the estimates of the Soviet defense budget made in the 1970's-1980's by CIA experts and which at the time were perceived as scandalous: The USSR's annual defense expenditures were estimated at \$250 billion-\$350 billion, including the investment part (research and development, finished products procurement, construction)—at \$150 billion-\$200 billion. At the time these estimates, which placed our defense budget at the level of the American one, were being refuted by a simple argument—market laws did not apply in the “most economical” Soviet economy.

Now, however, we no longer can say this. In our tortuously developing market economy today, many prices have reached, and in some instances exceeded, the world level. This process of leveling may at this point be proceeding unevenly, and our wages remain miserly, but nevertheless, nothing comes “free of charge” any more.

The Ministry of Defense tried to get R87 trillion for 1994 (as of the beginning of the year this equaled about \$45 billion)—approximately half of all expenses and two-thirds of all revenue budgeted by the federal government. Apparently, this was a realistic amount necessary to sustain what the defense department wanted to sustain. But the government attempted to keep defense expenditures at the level of approximately 5 percent of the GDP and asked the parliament for only R37 trillion, although the parliament did increase these expenditures to more than R40 trillion. The government's real revenue, however, will amount this year to only R70 trillion. The MO is financed better than any other department—with the exception of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service]—at the level of 60 percent of the appropriated amounts. That is, defense expenditures will amount to approximately R25 trillion-R30 trillion.

Of course, given our rate of inflation, extreme secrecy regarding the defense budget, and the lack of a scientifically substantiated deflator of defense expenditures, it is extremely difficult to determine the real cost of the defense budget. The chief of the Ministry of Defense's Main Military Budget and Financing Administration put these expenditures at \$6.5 billion. Apparently, in doing that, ruble expenditures were simply converted into dollars at the current exchange rate. But this method can hardly be accepted as justified.

It is impossible with such a defense budget to sustain an Armed Forces that maintain nuclear parity with the United States (which spend about \$260 billion on defense) and have three times more divisions than the Americans.

Maintenance of one regular American division costs \$2 billion-\$3 billion. The United States has 15 of them (plus another nine in reserve). According to the data of the authoritative annual publication “The 1994/1995 Military Balance,” published by the Institute of International Strategic Studies in London, Russia has about 80 divisions. Even making allowances for a special “weight” of our ruble in the defense sphere (for instance, low salaries

of military personnel), for Russia maintenance of one division would be in the equivalency of several million dollars or tens of billions of rubles. The London institute estimated the purchasing capacity of Russia's defense budget this year at \$78 billion.

The United States, with their aspiration to retain the role of “the only superpower,” that is, the capability to deploy the military in any part of the globe, today spends on defense about 4 percent of the GDP; European powers—2-3 percent; and Japan—1 percent. So what need do we have to keep defense expenditures at the level of the times of the Cold War? And if we take into account that the economic base for the current military machine continues to shrink, we will need to spend even more to maintain it—up to 25-30 percent of the GDP, that is, as during the period of “hot” rather than “cold” war.

It is time to begin to live within our means before we run out of steam. Russia does not have enough money to maintain its current Armed Forces. That is why our power utilities turn off electricity for nonpayment even at the Strategic Rocket Forces control centers.

Since we are turning into a market economy, we should acknowledge that in the next decade it will be extremely difficult for us to have a defense budget greater than that of such great powers as Japan (\$42 billion), Germany (\$35 billion), France (\$43 billion), and Great Britain (\$34 billion).

Does this mean that, having lost the role of the “superpower,” Russia is doomed to have second-class Armed Forces? Apparently, not necessarily so. It all depends, in my opinion, on whether we will be able, having recognized that our resources are limited, correctly to use the available means within Russia's defense budget.

The New Structure of the Armed Forces

We have inherited the “cost-based” structure of the military. For instance, Russia is the only country in the world that has five armed services. An armed service is an organizational structure that possesses sufficient autonomy to independently win a war. At the same time, an armed service is defined as a part of the Armed Forces intended for conducting military actions in a certain sphere—on the ground, at sea, and in the air. We, however, in addition to the ground forces, the Air Force, and the Navy, have two more armed services—the PVO [anti-aircraft defenses] and RVSN [Strategic Rocket Forces].

This in itself results in duplication and dilution of efforts. For instance, creation of the PVO artificially divided the air space between two Armed Forces branches (not counting aviation, ground forces, and the Navy). This has doomed us to give up even contemplating gaining superiority in the air. Keeping in mind that the CARE treaty imposes substantial quantitative

limitations on aviation, further preservation of the "air dualism" becomes absolutely impermissible.

As to RVSN, this is only one of the three components of the strategic triad; on top of that, after START-2 the RVSN will account for no more than one-third of Russia's nuclear forces. In the near future the foundation of Russian nuclear power for the first time will rest on strategic submarines, which will carry between 50 and 80 percent of all Russia's nuclear warheads. It is obvious that the existence of the fourth, strategic, branch of the Armed Forces would be logical in the event that we acknowledge that space is a new special sphere of war. Then apparently the existence of a special armed service—"above-air," "rocket-space"—would make sense.

Cutting the number of armed services is only one direction in the organizational restructuring of the Russian Armed Forces. The most important part, however, probably is getting rid of the structures whose purpose was to prepare for a new world war. If the scenario of a war between Russia and NATO is extremely unlikely, we do not need gigantic general military groups. In the near future the level of outside threat for Russia will remain low, although we cannot rule out that further on the situation in the south and the east may considerably deteriorate.

The main outside threat is local and border conflicts. Therefore, Russia does not need to maintain in peacetime already mobilized groups of ground forces in each potential theater of military operations, as the Soviet Union did during the years of the Cold War. We cannot be equally strong in all directions. Russia cannot maintain parity with all potential adversaries and keep such a huge permanent army in peacetime.

Besides, deploying large groups of Russian forces on the border with Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan not only is unnecessary, but actually is harmful, since it would only aggravate the Russian Federation's relations with former Soviet republics. On the European flanks, and in the Leningrad and North Caucasus military districts, Russia is strictly limited by the boundaries of the conventional forces reduction treaty, which does not allow it to maintain more than three regular divisions there (plus armaments in storage facilities for about three more divisions).

Apparently, the solution for Russia lies in creating mobile forces, which may be deployed as needed in any theater of military operations. *Maneuverability of forces and resources is the only alternative for a country with an immense territory but limited material and human resources.*

Mobility, however, is not limited to airborne troops. What is needed is the ability of strategically maneuvering a considerable part of ground troops, which must be appropriately equipped and trained for air-mobile operations. It also requires transportation aviation and advance storage of armaments and hardware.

Thus, Russia can and must substantially cut ground forces and switch to a more flexible organizational structure of the "corps—brigade" type instead of the more cumbersome "army—division" one.

At the same time, the relative significance of the role of the Air Force will increase, which will be aimed to ensuring air superiority. Any other way to ensure protection of the air space is unlikely.

As to the Navy, the vitally important interests of our national security are unlikely to demand of the Navy the task of ensuring the "global presence" for Russia. In addition to defending the territory and sea lines, the main task of the Navy will be to defend strategic nuclear submarines—the basis of national nuclear might in the twenty-first century.

Transition From the Draft System to a Professional Military

The question of a professional military in our country seems to have been dropped from the agenda lately—there is no money. And a professional military is indeed costly. But even the United States cannot afford to keep a 2.3-million-strong professional army—and this is precisely the strength of the armed forces our defense department wants to have.

It should be kept in mind, though, that we have never had such a large military in peacetime. After the civil war, being geopolitically encircled, the Soviet Union cut the Red Army to half a million troops. Even before World War II, Stalin kept on active duty fewer than 1.5 million troops. Can Russia be facing an even greater external threat now?

The habit of keeping a multi-million army in a state of combat readiness developed during the Cold War, when we constantly balanced on the brink of a "hot" war. But why would Russia need such an army now?

In my opinion, the desire to continue the draft is a departmental ploy to keep the inflated staff of the Armed Forces. Clearly, a professional military cannot be large. This is precisely why a hopeless attempt was made, contrary to economic and demographic limitations, to maintain the Armed Forces with the prescribed strength of over 2 million (only China, whose population is eight times greater than that in Russia, has a bigger military). This is not counting other military formations and "muscle structures" Russia has (border troops, OMON [Special Designation Militia Detachments], the MChS [Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Recovery From Natural Disasters], the FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service], the FAPSI [Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information], and others).

It is the overblown structure of the Russian military that makes it impossible for us to provide minimal social conditions for the officer corps. A vicious circle has developed, whereby the military essentially keeps on the

rolls approximately 200,000 "extra" middle-rank officers, since it cannot discharge them with all proper social guarantees. At the same time, to make up for the shortage of junior officers, military schools churn out tens of thousands of lieutenants annually, many of whom do not want to serve.

The draft is the legacy of the era of total war. In all the largest countries of the world, including China, the strength of the armed forces does not exceed 0.7-0.5 percent of the total population. We are not Iraq or the PDRK to keep more than 1 percent of the population on active duty in peacetime (and taking into account other muscle agencies—more than 2 percent).

On the whole, the draft excludes from economic activities its population's most active part, which adapts best to market conditions. The educational level of the aggregate labor force drops sharply. Last year we returned to drafting into the Army students of technical and vocational schools; this year, military chairs were liquidated in most institutions of higher learning. Most students do not return to their studies after Army service. As a result, a low-skilled soldier becomes a just-as-low-skilled worker.

When we are told that today 60, or perhaps 70 percent of the defense budget is used for personnel maintenance, it is not true. The truth is that the line item "Army and fleet maintenance," which accounts for 60 percent of our defense expenditures, also includes expenses on maintaining infrastructure (electric power, fuel, transportation, lease payments, etc.), as well as military training. Naturally, the bigger the military, the greater the expense on its material and technical support. Realistically, expenses on personnel maintenance comprise approximately one-third of the defense budget.

In the same way, expenditures under the line item "military construction" include first and foremost expenses on construction of bases for the units and formations brought back to the territory of Russia. Less than half of the expenditures under this line item goes for construction of housing for homeless officers.

A transition to a volunteer manning of the Armed Forces is an inalienable part of qualitative strengthening of the Armed Forces while simultaneously reducing their numeric strength. *Qualitative superiority is first of all superiority in personnel training.*

A draftee cannot be taught in a year and a half to handle modern military hardware professionally. The effectiveness of a professional soldier is incommensurately higher than the effectiveness of a draftee. A professional military will also allow us to cut dramatically "at variance with regulations" relations—to be precise, crime against draftees. Professionalism of the military personnel will result in higher fighting fitness of the Armed Forces.

Today the actual strength of the Armed Forces is hardly higher than 1.7 million, of whom about 1 million are professional military—officers and warrant officers, as

well as contract soldiers. That is, with the same or even smaller expenditures on personnel we could today have a fully professional army of about 1.2-1.3 million, but the army that would be considerably more fit for combat than the current Armed Forces. In such an army, a normal ratio would be restored between the enlisted and the officer (including warrant officers) personnel—3:1.

Of course, transition to a professional military cannot be accomplished overnight. It is necessary to work out a system of incentives for quality military contract personnel. But with sensible use of available budget means, the problem of reducing the prescribed structure could be resolved in a matter of a few years.

Naturally, this will require a simultaneous implementation of another state program—social settlement of discharged military personnel. It is the duty of the state to help them to get housing and work.

Military-Technical Aspects

It is time to acknowledge that we can no longer maintain the traditionally Russian approach: "Overcome and overpower." In the era of military-technical revolution, Suворov's principle "a bullet is stupid and a bayonet is smart" can hardly serve as a basis for military organizational development. *In any hypothetical major military conflict of the future, Russia will not possess a quantitative superiority either in manpower or in armaments.* This is final, considering the economic and human resources of the center of force surrounding Russia (NATO, which under the CARE treaty has a three-to-one superiority over Russia in main conventional weapons; the Islamic world; China; and Japan).

Russia's military security can be ensured only on the basis of qualitative factors. The collapse of the Russian economy, if it results in de-industrialization and a hopeless technological lag, by the beginning of the next decade will result in Russia's losing the position of a great military power. Therefore, preventing economic collapse and restoration of Russia's economic might is the basis of preservation and development of the defense might of our state. However, military production can ensure qualitative superiority, or at least prevent falling behind the leading military powers in a military-technical sense, only if it is supported by a high level of technical development of the economy as a whole instead of the VPK isolated from the poorly developed civilian economy.

Thus, the desire to preserve the gigantic production capacities of the VPK, meant to produce for the Soviet Army in mass quantities military hardware that quickly becomes obsolete, is basically meaningless. With the general reduction of the volume of defense expenditures, the share of the investment part of the defense budget (weapons procurement, research and development, construction) has dropped from two-thirds to one-third. And keep in mind that the Ministry of Defense had placed orders at military enterprises before the state budget for 1994 was adopted. The parliament, however,

appropriated five times less money than the volume of contracts, and only in June were the state orders adjusted and cut in half. But the liability for payments on state orders has exceeded R3 trillion.

This fall 400 defense enterprises already halted operations, and 1,500 are operating at greatly reduced capacity.

The specificity of the current situation is that at a time when many flagships of the Russian VPK are demonstrating fantastic prototypes of the most modern weapons, the Ministry of Defense will not be able to purchase them. The current tidal wave of state-of-the-art Russian military hardware is the response to Reagan's bluff, who at the beginning of 1980's initiated a score of new defense programs. But at the beginning of 1990's, when research and development on these programs was completed, the United States refused to purchase the weapons. The changed geopolitical situation and defense budget cuts resulted in the Pentagon's sharply reducing the share of procurement in the defense budget. At the same time, the Americans maintained and even increased expenditures on scientific development. As a result, the ratio between expenditures on weapons and on research and development, which under Reagan measured almost 3:1, now is close to 1:1.

In my opinion, we cannot realize this wave of scientific-technical achievements either—there is no economic base and no military-political need. The example of the United States shows that it is more important to "jump over" the current stage in the development of defense hardware and make a bet on twenty-first-century technologies. That is why the Americans decided not to proceed with mass production.

In general, nobody except the United States produces the entire nomenclature of military items—this is unprofitable. We, on the other hand, attempted this year (absolutely hopelessly) to achieve a 15-percent profit margin in the defense industry. Can the Russian Federation afford what Japan, Germany, England, France, Italy, and China cannot, especially keeping in mind that some important elements of the Soviet VPK have now ended up abroad—in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other new independent states? Can our industry maintain full self-sufficiency of the Russian Armed Forces without increasing to an even greater extent the degree of militarization of the economy and the society?

Neither should we forget that still have to deal with the technically very difficult and very expensive tasks of destroying great quantities of nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional arms in order to fulfill our international obligations, as well as because of the expiration of the useful life of many weapons systems (for instance, the reactors of more than 100 nuclear submarines).

Our VPK must have clear priorities. We no longer can do everything. Apparently, a more narrow specialization of military production is inevitable. The military might of Russia in the current conditions does not require a large-scale production of traditional old and even many current weapons, with the exception of a very limited number of

new systems that are vitally important for ensuring the security of our state (for instance, single-warhead strategic missiles).

In addition, it is necessary to move away from the excessive bias in favor of strike systems while at the same time not paying enough attention to systems ensuring their effective use. The orientation on qualitative superiority requires concentration of effort on *overcoming our lag in the systems of combat control, intelligence, and communications*. This will allow us to balance Russia's Armed Forces and sharply increase their combat capabilities.

Of principal importance is the preservation of the country's scientific-technical potential. Over the past year the level of research and development financing dropped impermissibly low. Its share in the defense budget dropped from 18.1 percent in 1989 to 5.5 percent in 1994. As a result, the ratio between weapons procurement and research and development measured 3:1. That is, what is happening here is completely the opposite to what the United States is doing. This means that we are attempting today to save production capacities, which the military-technical progress will make useless tomorrow anyway. If military research and development is destroyed, the collapse of Russian military potential in the beginning of the next decade is inevitable.

Russian private capital, into the hands of which four-fifths of defense enterprises will shift in the near future, hardly has enough means to go and invest money in unprofitable enterprises, preferring to buy up on the cheap the latest technological achievements of our VPK. In these circumstances, there is no alternative to a state conversion program.

In experts' estimates, the cost of conversion in Russia will amount to at least \$150 billion, but the government allocated for these purposes over the past few years R120 billion (in 1992 prices). This is no more than 10 percent of what is needed.

Unfortunately, our leadership simply talked conversion to death. First conversion was declared a "party duty" (Ligachev); then financing was sharply cut (Gaydar); then the VPK was exhorted to search for a way out through exports, on the "save yourself" principle; then there was a promise to find "nonbudget funds." As a result, what is taking place instead of structural restructuring is a deterioration of Russia's industrial potential. According to the State Committee on Defense Industry data, over the first half of 1994 production of defense-related items at VPK enterprises declined by 42.1 percent, but production of civilian output at the same enterprises also declined—by 40.8 percent.

As to promises to solve the conversion problem through exports, this is an illusion. The world arms market shrunk over the last five years by one-third. Our arms exports fell approximately tenfold and cannot be quickly restored. And anyway, a greater part of our exports were delivered essentially on a nonrepayable basis, as "brotherly assistance" to Cuba, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Campuchia,

South Yemen, and so on. We have lost the East European market—our former Warsaw Pact allies are trying as hard as they can to reorient themselves toward NATO. The oil-producing Libya, Iraq, and Iran could purchase our arms, but this is impossible for political reasons.

We will have to try to regain the arms market in acute competition with Western suppliers. It looks as if in the best-case scenario Russian arms exports will not climb over the \$5-billion a year mark anytime soon. This is not going to solve the problem of conversion, while at the same time it may make our foreign policy situation more difficult if we continue to sell state-of-the-art arms to countries capable of threatening Russia's national security.

Instead of the mythical "nonbudget funds," we need regional conversion programs, a whole set of tax preferences and credits, and a federal system of retraining defense industry workers. This will require considerable money. But it is better to allocate this money now and try to solve the problem within a few years than to bring it to the point of the absurd by giving the VPK the money to produce unneeded output.

Before It Is Too Late

We cannot forever postpone the military reform. The government's budget request for 1995 retains defense expenditures as the largest line item. The appropriation under the "national defense" line item is expected in the amount of R45 trillion—R41.3 trillion of which is for organizational development and maintenance of the Armed Forces, R2.7 trillion for military pensions, R1 trillion for the Ministry of Atomic Energy's military programs, and another R200 billion to support mobilization sectors in industry.

One cannot fail to notice that the new budget envisages a considerable cut in the Ministry of Defense's expenditures. Given our inflation, R45 trillion in current prices (unless the promise to bring inflation down to 1 percent a month actually is kept) will result in at least a 1.5-fold cut of real defense expenditures.

For the first time over many decades, our defense expenditures will be less than 5 percent of the GDP. Such a budget makes it impossible to keep the military at its present size. The government message to the State Duma says that the numeric strength of the Armed Forces will decrease by the end of 1995 to 1.469 million, that is, will be reduced by almost half a million over one year.

Thus, next year we will pay the price for having blocked any attempts at serious reform in the defense sphere. Cutting military personnel by one-quarter makes accelerating military reform absolutely imperative. Because another attempt to "dilute" budget cuts may result in a virtual disintegration of the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, the ratios in the defense budget are being changed only insignificantly. The share of research and development is rising to only 8.3 percent. This is 2.5 times less than for weapons procurement, and 1.5 times less than for capital

construction. That is, the negative trends of the past few years remain practically unchanged.

The military should have the greatest stake in the soonest possible implementation of the long-overdue military reform. Is it not clear that attempts to squeeze in additional appropriations for defense are unlikely to bring results? Defense expenditures will comprise 22 percent of the entire federal budget in 1995 (21 percent in 1994). There is no way to get any more money.

The 1995 budget should become the first step toward a real military reform. It is clear that the current level of military expenditures is the absolute limit (or even beyond the limit). But the main point is not—or at least not only—that the defense budget has to be cut. The main point is to overcome the inertia of the past few years and move to sensible reforms in the military sphere, supporting them by concrete budget items instead of empty promises.

1. Any talk about reform is meaningless as long as the Ministry of Defense's budget request fits onto one page. Let secrets remain secrets, but *the defense budget must be finally opened up*. Expenses must be itemized—both by the armed services and by specific weapons programs. It is time to figure out what the cost will be for a new group of troops that is being created after their transfer to Russia. It is also necessary to have the data on actual instead of prescribed strength of the forces.
2. The defense budget must reveal not only the expenses but also income of the Ministry of Defense. Commercial activities here are going on, on a large scale. And expenditure of this money must be accounted for not only for the sake of stemming corruption, but also in searching for effective sources to finance the reform.
3. The 1995 defense budget must be considered together with the *long-term program of military organizational development—until the year 2000*. Because if the current expenditures are not linked to the implementation of structural reforms, the vicious circle will continue, and every time we will be encountering the same problems.
4. The military reform demands formally establishing in the state budget a score of large public programs—*conversion; fulfillment of international obligations on arms reductions and elimination; social settlement of military servicemen*. These are not the Ministry of Defense's departmental problems—these are national-scale tasks, and they must be solved not within the framework of military expenditures, but as independent programs in the federal budget.
5. Quite likely, we will not be able to define the military reform's priorities right away. But a close interaction between the Ministry of Defense and other governmental agencies with the parliament, with bringing in independent experts, conducting a series of open and closed parliamentary hearings will allow us to avoid unnecessary bureaucratic games and political spectacles, and ensure coordination of state organs' actions in carrying out the planned measures.

NAVAL FORCES

State of, Recommendations for Fix to Navy

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[Article by Yuriy Zaynashv: "The Admiral of Holey Ships: The Naval Leader Loved for Submarines To Be Thoroughly Noisy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Today, 25 October, the State Duma is holding hearings, prepared even by as many as three Duma committees, on the situation in the Navy. What will be the subject of discussions there?*

In February 1992 Deputy Minister of Security Nikolay Golushko sadly wrote Russian Procurator-General Valentin Stepankov:

"The noise level of USSR Navy SSN's is 20-30 times higher than that of the Americans and the effectiveness of domestic sonar equipment is more than 25 times inferior to them. For the above reasons the U.S. Navy achieved the capability of detecting Soviet RPK SN [not further expanded, possibly strategic missile submarines] with a probability of 0.95 and is in a position to monitor over 75 percent of the area of strategically important parts of the World Ocean.

"In the opinion of a wide range of specialists, the main responsibility in the situation at hand falls on the military-industrial complex, Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, and the Navy leadership, which in the late 1970's and early 1980's formed a false impression in the leadership of the country and USSR Ministry of Defense about ways of achieving acoustic equality with U.S. Navy SSN's."

The newspaper PRAVDA would have written in this regard that our powerful Navy had been undone by democrats. Not long ago this newspaper published an article by former CINC Navy Admiral Chernavin, who mourned the country's increasingly decrepit defense. As a matter of fact, the main blame for the fact that our ships turned into floating targets falls on naval leader Chernavin himself and on former CPSU Central Committee Secretary Lev Zaykov.

Beginning in the 1960's, the U.S. Navy had reduced the noise level of its nuclear powered submarines by 30 times and the Americans increased by 100 times the range at which they now could detect Soviet submarines. Any submarine of ours going into the Atlantic Ocean beyond the Spitsbergen Archipelago-Bear Island-Nordkapp (Norway) line and beyond the line of the Kurile Islands or from Kamchatka was being tracked precisely by the Americans. We had only 15 percent of submarines on alert status, while the Americans had 50 percent.

From the beginning of the 1980's, for outwardly inexplicable reasons, Admiral Chernavin "rebuffed" all naval specialists who proposed reducing the noise level of our

submarine fleet and attempting to get back equilibrium for the country with the Americans at sea. And in October 1987 Lev Zaykov, his protector from Staraya ploshchad [Old Square], took a classified decree through the Central Committee and Council of Ministers, which from then on permitted military-industrial complex enterprises to produce, and the Navy to accept, warships without armament and equipment if the Navy so wished.

From then on it remained for Minister-Shipbuilder Belousov merely to "come to an agreement" with Admiral Chernavin and it was possible to launch any unfinished ship, just so she did not sink right away. In 1988 alone 8 submarines, 16 ships and 3 support vessels were accepted from the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry with numerous instances of incomplete work. In the opinion of naval specialists, this Central Committee decree led to loss of the Navy's combat readiness.

That same note from Nikolay Golushko states that the heavy air-capable cruiser Admiral Flota Kuznetsov was made operational in 1990 in a noncombat effective status. Design Project 956 ships, the heavy cruiser Kalinin, the combatant ships Admiral Vinogradov and Akademik Konstantinov, Design Project 667 BRDM and Design Project 675 MKV submarines and others were launched with incomplete work and violations of standards.

Many naval specialists, including Admiral of the Fleet (Retired) Georgiy Yegorov, former chief of the Main Naval Staff and Hero of the Soviet Union; Admiral (Retired) Nikolay Amelko, former deputy CINC Navy and former deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; Captain 1st Rank (Reserve) Albert Khrapovich; Captain 1st Rank (Retired) Ilya Kolton and others suggest that State Duma deputies recommend the following today:

TO THE PRESIDENT

1. Establish a State Commission made up of Federal Assembly deputies, naval specialists and independent military experts from among reserve and retired admirals and officers who are initiators of the present parliamentary hearings for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive inspection of the Navy.
2. Establish unified state expert examination of design projects based on the "cost-effectiveness" criterion independent of manufacturers and customers, and also a unified state system for testing and accepting ships, armament and military equipment subordinate to the Supreme Commander.
3. Repeal the effect of CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree No 1241-302 of 30 October 1987, which even to this day allows ships, armament and military equipment not conforming to contractual terms with respect to combat effectiveness to be turned over (accepted).
4. Give instructions on developing a new Russian shipbuilding program.

TO THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY

Legislatively ensure Navy financing with a separate line of the budget.

TO THE PROCURATOR GENERAL

By the end of 1994 complete the investigation of the catastrophe of the submarine Komsomolets and finally bring the case to court.

It is not by chance that the officers link Admiral Chernavin's activity with the loss of Komsomolets. As Ilya Kolton, a veteran of the submarine fleet, declares, Mr. Chernavin sent some submarines to sea without any hope of rescue in case of an accident, since rescue chambers often had flaws. A study of the criminal case over the Komsomolets catastrophe shows that incomplete work in the rescue chamber design was one of the possible causes for loss of navymen.

Meanwhile, numerous navymen continue to sail in ships and submarines which shipbuilders simply did not complete. In case of trouble, let the crews of these "floating targets" speak well of the retired admiral and former Central Committee secretary.

[Box insert]

What the Russian Navy now has:

- 56 strategic missile submarines—SSBN's;
- 486 surface warships (of which 72 are oceangoing);
- 166 multipurpose submarines (of which 89 are nuclear powered—SSN's);
- 310 small combatants for various purposes;
- 950 auxiliary vessels;
- 1,580 aircraft and 566 helicopters.

In quantitative makeup, the Russian Navy has only one-third of modern ships. At least 70 percent will be decommissioned in the next ten years and over 100 submarines and around 300 surface ships will be subject to recycling by the end of the 1990's.

Missions, Politics, Aircraft Carriers

95UM0084A Moscow INZHENER in Russian
No 3, 1994 pp 12-13

[Article by A. Vasilyev under rubric "Introducing": "Do We Need Aircraft Carriers?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Aircraft carriers... In the cold war years these were "weapons of aggression," an instrument for conducting "gunboat diplomacy." Another propagandistic cliché appeared in perestroika years: "Monsters of the military-industrial complex, devouring billions in taxpayers' rubles."*

Based on popular narrow-minded formulas such as "fewer weapons, more sausage," our leaders already have placed the entire space program on the brink of disruption and have driven quality development of aircraft into a dead-end. As a result of following the present political course, a most serious blow also was dealt to the entire Navy, particularly to the program for building Russian aircraft carriers.

1. History of 'Floating Airfields'

In referring to the history of creation of air-capable ships and development of their employment tactics, it is possible to find many surprising facts. It turns out that the idea of employing aircraft in the Navy, seemingly absurd at first glance, already has a rather respectable age. The first successful takeoff from a ship's deck was made from the cruiser BIRMINGHAM on 14 November 1910 by U.S. pilot Eli [as transliterated], and he also was the first to land an aircraft, but the Navy arrived earlier than the Army at the idea of using aircraft not only for detecting enemy ships, but also for destroying them. By the way, first place in delivering a bombing attack against a naval target from the air belongs to Russian naval pilots: on 29 October 1914 they attacked the German battle cruiser GEBEN [as transliterated] in the Black Sea. The British battleship FURIOUS (1917) became the very first ship with the principal distinguishing feature of an aircraft carrier—a deck outfitted as a runway.

Following World War II, aircraft carriers intended for major naval engagements played an enormous role in local wars and armed conflicts. U.S. carrier forces have the war against North Korea and Vietnam, the strike against Libya in 1986, a number of other combat operations in the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf war "behind them." The British were able to get back the disputed Falkland (Malvinas) Islands for the British Crown in 1982 because of aircraft carriers.

2. Aircraft Carriers and Military Doctrine

The main virtue of aircraft carriers is their universality and, in contrast to ICBM's, for example, the possibility of their being employed both in a large-scale conflict with employment of nuclear weapons and in local wars.

Russia's new military doctrine presumes that the probability of a world nuclear or conventional war being initiated has diminished considerably for the foreseeable future, and now local armed conflicts represent the main danger to the world and stability. It would appear that the need for creating a powerful carrier fleet should stem from this thesis alone. Russia has no fewer interests which must be defended (unfortunately for now only by military force) than other countries which have carriers in the inventory. The paragraph that appeared in the political section of military doctrine that, along with traditional missions, the Russian Armed Forces also have a mission such as conducting peacemaking operations by decision of the UN Security Council and within the CIS framework also seemingly should have roused the country's military and political leadership to build air-capable ships. Without them, Russian soldiers risk becoming cannon fodder in the job of protecting more foreign foreign-policy interests than their own. The fact is, to "cool off" a center of tension it is sometimes rather simple to demonstrate military strength, of which the aircraft carrier became the symbol in the 20th century.

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The opinion of foreign specialists reduces to the fact that in connection with the appearance of new kinds of missile weaponry and electronic equipment, the struggle in air space in conducting combat operations at sea has acquired decisive importance in recent decades. Under these conditions, without carrier cover a fleet cannot get farther from its shores than several hundred nautical miles, the operating range of shore-based aircraft. Even submarines, which are losing to the Americans in concealment, will not be able to go far into the ocean without the risk of being detected by enemy ASW aircraft.

Consequently, our Navy's capabilities in this case are limited to defensive coastal operations, the effectiveness of which will prove to be considerably diminished because of the enemy's overwhelming numerical strength at sea. The figures speak for themselves. The Russian Navy has been deprived of a ship type such as battleships and large aircraft carriers; 7 Russian air-capable cruisers are forced to oppose 30 carriers of NATO countries, including 18 U.S. carriers. U.S. Naval Aviation numbers 6,300 aircraft and helicopters, while Russian Naval Aviation barely numbers 1,000.

In following its so-called naval strategy, which implies massive strikes against enemy territory from a great distance, the U.S. Navy will be able to blockade Russian naval bases and airfields in a short time (carrier forces are capable of covering up to 700 nm in 24 hours) after bottling up the submarines, after which they will be capable of delivering strikes against sectors not covered by shore-based aircraft. The air wing based on a U.S. attack carrier is capable of delivering 144,000 kg of precision bombs to targets in one combat sortie. Russia's lack of carriers and the limited operating range of land-based fighters (up to 1,500 km) will allow enemy submarines to deliver a strike against our airfields and naval bases with both nuclear as well as conventional weapons.

The above scenarios of combat operations attest to the fact that the absence of a powerful carrier fleet is depriving the Russian Navy of the capability of meeting forces of a potential enemy on distant lines and effectively opposing them.

3. Politicians and Aircraft Carriers

Russia's lack of a powerful air fleet is by no means the result of the constant negative attitude of all the country's political leaders toward this type of ship.

Alas, fate so ordained that the entire history of aircraft carrier construction in our country be reduced merely to the history of attempts at building them. Back in the 1920's plans were drawn up in the USSR for refitting as aircraft carriers the battleship Frunze, which had had a fire, and the unfinished cruiser Izmail. The construction was not completed. It seemed the big naval program of the mid-1930's also bypassed aircraft carriers... But

having discovered the blown-up hull of the supersecret cruiser Krasnaya Ukraina in captured Kiev in 1941, the Germans arrived at the unanimous opinion that she was intended to be an aircraft carrier and could have been launched already in 1942.

The first postwar USSR shipbuilding program envisaged construction of 9 battleships, 15 aircraft carriers, 62 cruisers and 500 submarines. This time the blow against the state's naval might was delivered by N. Khrushchev, who declared that aircraft carriers were floating targets for missiles.

The actual designing of a light aircraft carrier which had begun was stopped in the final account, just as was the beginning of series construction of the TU-91 Bychok deck-based attack aircraft, which possessed outstanding characteristics for those times—one aircraft's missile armament corresponded to no less than a cruiser's gun salvo.

Two Moskva-Class helicopter carriers and four Kiev-Class ASW cruisers were built during the 1960's-1970's in place of full-fledged aircraft carriers, but they could not cover the fleet from the sky. Therefore an aircraft carrier for 70 aircraft began to be designed under the code name Orel, but the design characteristics were changed toward a fivefold reduction at the initiative first of the Ministry of Defense and then of the General Staff. Finally in 1982 they approved a project for building four "heavy air-capable cruisers." Only one was built under this program—Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov. The blow was delivered against the others by G. Arbatov, director of the USA and Canada Institute, having declared on television in 1989 that construction of the carriers would be expensive and entirely senseless with general disarmament. By the way, the Americans held a different view of their plan for building attack aircraft carriers.

The leaders of independent Ukraine finished off the carrier program by stopping the fitting out of the next ship, Varyag, which they planned to sell abroad, and by cutting up for scrap the larger Ulyanovsk, which they were supposed to equip with a nuclear power plant. True, Kuznetsov managed to be saved—she was transferred out of harm's way to the Northern Fleet...

Thus politicians destroyed the domestic program for creating aircraft carriers that had been approved with such hard work. It remains only to hope that common sense will triumph in the final account and aircraft carriers will be viewed not from an ideological, but from a military-strategic standpoint. The country's leadership must understand that aircraft carriers are not the symbol of an aggressive superpower (it was not for expansion that Brazil and Argentina built aircraft carriers) and are not a waste of billions in funds (without them the entire Navy essentially becomes useless), but a real means for ensuring security and defending Russia's national interests.

UKRAINE

Kuchma Signs 'Defense of Ukraine' Amendments

95UM0076B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
4 Nov 94 p 1

[Text of law]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Law of Ukraine on Changes and Amendments to Article 17 of the Law of Ukraine "The Defense of Ukraine"

The Supreme Soviet of Ukraine decrees:

That changes and amendments with the following wording be made in Article 17 of the Law of Ukraine "The Defense of Ukraine" (VIDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOYI RADY UKRAYINY, 1992, No. 9, p 106, and 1993, No. 44, p 420:

"Article 17. Territorial Defense

"Territorial defense is the set of nationwide, military and special measures that are employed during a threat or outbreak of aggression, with the aim of protecting and defending the State Border against encroachments from without, providing conditions for the reliable functioning of state bodies, the mobilization and operational deployment of troops or forces and the protection of important facilities and lines of communication, fighting commando and reconnaissance forces and other armed formations of an aggressor on the territory of the country, as well as the radiation, chemical and biological protection of the troops and the population against the consequences of accidents or destruction at nuclear power plants or facilities that are unsafe in a chemical regard, and upholding the conditions of a state of emergency.

"The Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the bodies and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, the Border Troops of Ukraine, the Civil Defense Troops of Ukraine and other military formations created in accordance with the legislation of Ukraine are all enlisted in performing the tasks of territorial defense within the bounds of their jurisdiction.

"The principal measures, organization of territorial defense and procedure for the interaction of ministries and agencies are defined by the Statute on Territorial Defense of Ukraine, as approved by the President of Ukraine."

President of Ukraine L. Kuchma

City of Kiev, 20 October 1994

Shmarov Chairs Meeting on Soldiers' Quality of Life Problems

95UM0076A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian
5 Nov 94 p 1

[Article by NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent Senior Lieutenant Ruslan Tkachuk: "The Problems of the Army

Are Worsening, and the Situation Demands Non-Standard Solutions of Commanders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] NARODNA ARMIYA has already reported that an all-Ukraine council on military problems was held in Kiev on November 3. The organizer was the Committee on Issues of Social Protections for Servicemen of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Representatives of the Supreme Soviet, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Defense [MO] of Ukraine, the National Guard and civilian organizations took part in the council. Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Ukraine Valeriy Shmarov gave a report of the state of affairs in the armed forces.

The head of the military agency dwelled on three main issues—social protections for servicemen, regulation order in units, and the role of commanders under conditions of increased economic crisis in the nation. He indicated in particular that society today has reached the point of the need for implementing shock therapy. These methods are well known and, undoubtedly, will be difficult for both the public and for the armed forces. The idea reigns in some circles today that the army is headed for collapse. It is worse for the military organism to adapt to the situation, true, caused by the crisis in production. The commanders are not ready to lead their collectives under conditions of a scarcity of what is essential—funds, fuel, material resources etc. One also cannot disregard the fact that economic depression has led to a collapse of morality in the people. That is favorable soil for the development of theft, injustice and lawlessness. Such instances are indeed known in the armed forces. One example is the Khirivska Air-Mobile Division (PrykVO [Carpathian Military District]). The criminal irresponsibility and indifference of the command has made robbing the soldiers' table the norm in that unit. Some servicemen came down with dystrophy as a result.

"The problems in the army are worsening," asserted the Minister of Defense. "This is not, however, a reason to hang our heads. A great deal depends on the commanders today. The situation demands non-standard solutions from them. They are ready to perform their duty with regard to the fighting ability of the armed forces. The military organism, without looking at all of the components, is operating at a suitable pace. The preparations for winter are proceeding quite successfully. Fuel and uniforms have been procured. Work is concluding on the preparation of the barracks, housing accommodations etc. The military is waiting for the final performance evaluation for the summer training period."

Valery Shmarov dwelled on the housing problem in particular. The success of the reforms in the armed forces of Ukraine, he indicated, will depend on its resolution. He thus feels, as Minister of Defense, that it is problem number one for him.

Some 72,000 servicemen have not been provided with housing as of today. No fewer than 20,000 apartments a

year must be built for the next three or four years in order to provide accommodations for that quantity of people. More than a thousand accommodations will be turned over before the end of this year. The capabilities of the military construction personnel and subcontractors are being preserved, but an increase in them requires the necessary corresponding funding. There is no certainty here, and the budget is taking shape negatively as a whole. A proposal will be submitted to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine pertaining to introducing into the budget a specific line item for financing of the construction of housing for the military. The enlisting of extrabudgetary investments and local and regional funds remains an important point in solving this problem.

The Minister of Defense, in assessing the state of discipline among the troops, expressed dissatisfaction with the pursuit of measures to strengthen regulation order in the units. All efforts on this plane have had little effectiveness. The number of instances of non-regulation relations increased by 46 percent in 1994. One out of two crimes among the troops are the evasion of service. The number of thefts and suicides has also increased, including of officers and warrant officers.

What are the reasons for the poor effectiveness of indoctrination work among the troops? The negative trends, in the opinion of Valeriy Shmarov, are a consequence of the breakdown of the "society—state—armed forces" system. The localization of the problems of the army is an illness of the corresponding directorates of the MO. Everything here is self-contained: the poor training of specialists, their lack of a vested interest in the work, the imperfect nature of legislation etc. A program at the state level that would involve local authorities, public bodies and scientific institutions in these problems is exceedingly necessary today.

"The former system of political officers, albeit based on fundamentally opposite principles, was a strong one," emphasized the Minister of Defense. "It does not exist today, and no tool equivalent to it exists either. We should not shun tried and true methods, but on the

contrary arm ourselves with them. They are rejecting the collective subscription to newspapers in the military units, they have little respect for visual propaganda etc. Why are we squandering this?"

Valeriy Shmarov, in conclusion, expressed the hope that the results of the all-Ukraine council on military issues will be of concrete benefit to the army and servicemen, and will serve to unite the efforts of society.

The chairman of the Committee on Issues of Social Protections for Servicemen of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Major-General Vilen Martyrosyan, also presented a report at the council. He dwelled on the question of cadre personnel. He insisted, in particular, on the necessity of changes in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Defense. He touched on the problem of "hazing." The resolution of that will have to be launched immediately by the Ministry of Defense, emphasized the head of the committee.

Major-General V. Martyrosyan pointed out the importance of an effective Congress of Servicemen. It should become, in his opinion, the very body that would unite the efforts of state, public and military structures.

People's Deputy of Ukraine Hennadiy Samokhvalov, Main Organizational-Mobilization Directorate Chief and Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Major-General Valeriy Venher, Slavyanskyy Academic Center for the Retraining of Officers in Economics, Business and Law Director Viktoriya Pidubna and Committee of Soldiers' Mothers of Ukraine Co-Chairwoman Fatima Bachynska, among others, also spoke to the participants in the council.

A decree on the results of the work of the all-Ukraine council and an appeal to the President of Ukraine and the Supreme Soviet were adopted. They indicated concrete proposals for the improvement of legislation that regulates the draft into the army, the performance of conscript military service, and social protections for servicemen and the members of their families, reserve officers and invalids of the armed forces.

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Discussion of Possible New U.S. High-Speed Stealth Aircraft

95UM0085A Moscow INZHENER in Russian
No 3, 1994 pp 14-15

[Article by Aleksandr Vasilyev under rubric "Introducing": "U.S. 'Flying Triangles': New Technologies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The technological lag which has been seen in the domestic defense industry because of a lack of financial resources threatens to turn in the not-too-distant future into the inability of Russian Armed Forces to oppose the West's qualitatively new models of combat equipment. Electronics, computer equipment and "thinking weapons" already are crowding conventional kinds of arms and will determine the conduct of all combat operations in upcoming decades.

The influence of new technologies is most noticeable in military aviation. While domestic electronic equipment of aircraft still is comparable with American equipment, a significant lag already is seen in the area of applying a technology such as stealth. The fact is, this is what made a revolution in aviation comparable with the transition from piston to jet engines. Now it is not speed, but "invisibility" that has become the chief factor. Even the most imperfect F-117A fighter, built with this technology and called a "lame dwarf" for its external homelessness, became a real star in combat operations against Iraq. Practically invisible on radar screens, F-117A's easily penetrated the initially rather strong Iraqi air defense system. They accounted for only 5 percent of combat sorties by multinational forces aircraft and around a third of all strategic targets struck, and this with an ordnance payload several times less than that of conventional fighter-bombers.

While our MiG-31's and the newest Su-35 still are capable of combating this first-generation "invisible being," which made its first flight back in 1981, will they be up to the B-2 strategic bomber and YF-22A air superiority fighter (which is to replace the F-15) created in the 1990's?

For example, with its considerable size, the B-2 bomber has a radar cross-section (by which the aircraft is picked up on radar) of only one square meter!

But even these aircraft, which are fantastic in appearance, are a matter of today. Entirely new flying craft—it is already difficult to call them aircraft because they have such an unusual shape—are on the approach.

And the Americans hardly would have given the Russian side an opportunity to inspect B-2 bombers in accordance with the START II Treaty if they did not already have something surpassing their previous "creations."

These new aircraft combine in themselves not only inconspicuousness, but also enormous, hypersonic speeds reached thanks to the use of nontraditional types of aerodynamic configurations and power plants.

Information trickled into the U.S. press in early March of last year to the effect that the United States already had created a supersonic reconnaissance aircraft code-named Aurora, which surpassed the most modern aircraft by two times in speed and altitude. Back in the mid-1980's an item was included in the annual Air Force budget about appropriation of two billion dollars for developing a new top secret program, and repeated evidence of flights of new flying craft over Nevada leave no doubt that the Americans have prototypes of at the very least three "invisible beings" of the next generation. One of them is a low-signature, quiet aircraft of triangular shape, and another also was described by observers as "black, big and very quiet." A high-speed aircraft also was noticed whose flights, conversely, were characterized by a very loud, pulsating sound and a dense smoke trail. According to statements by certain officials, at least one of the new types of flying craft capable of flying at hypersonic speeds already has reached the stage of starting up in series production and being placed in operation.

Such successful tests of the newest U.S. military equipment, destined to be a first-strike weapon by virtue of its technical features, cannot help but place one on guard. Proposals of a leading U.S. firm to create an unmanned hypersonic aircraft flying at speeds ten times that of sound and intended for pinpointing air defense systems also attest to the aggressiveness of the new direction in development of combat aviation. Enormous speed and maneuverability make it practically invulnerable to SAM systems of the last generation. According to statements by a number of experts, the scientific-technical base for creating such an aircraft already exists.

With just what will we be able to realistically oppose the present "partner" in a new spiral of the arms race if he suddenly again turns into an enemy (which of course no one wishes)? The problem does not lie in an absence of engineering developments. For example, in late 1991 western specialists learned that Russia was successfully creating an aircraft based on stealth technology at a signature level comparable with the F-117. The entire question reduces to sources of financing, because of whose absence domestic design bureaus are inclined toward a considerably less expensive program of modernizing the already existing and flying MiG and Sukhoi aircraft. Things are even worse in the area of bomber aircraft. We have nothing, nor is anything anticipated, newer than the Tu-160 bomber, whose production moreover was frozen at the Americans' insistence. And the hopelessness and vulnerability of that class of aircraft developed into repeated bans on flights of the B-1B bomber, the U.S. equivalent of our Tu.

It is becoming quite obvious that foreign high-tech weapons require an adequate response. In undertaking a significant and often unilateral quantitative reduction in arms and combat equipment, our military leadership is declaring the need to shift to qualitative indicators of defense capability, "forgetting" that the country does not have the necessary funds for replacing quantity with quality. If aircraft construction continues under unfavorable financing conditions

and measures are not taken to overcome the technological gap now, then under conditions of disintegration of the air defense system and loss of a number of strategic radars from sovereignization of former USSR republics, Russian aviation hardly will be able to oppose "flying triangles," wave craft [volnolety] and other exotic "invisible beings" that fly at hypersonic speeds or slink silently in the night.

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